

SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY IN THE LIGHT OF JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS

Key words: *San Francisco Peace Treaty, realism paradigm, neorealism in international relations, problems of Taiwan, Senkaku islands, containment of China.*

The following article is devoted to the analysis of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 in the light of Sino-Japanese relations and those unresolved problems that originate in the 'Time of Troubles'. According to this system, the states of East Asia and the Pacific region live to this day. Japan and China are the main players in East Asia and have a great influence on the international situation as a whole. The absence of the PRC, and the government of Chiang Kai-shek, at the conference in San Francisco gives rise to Beijing's desire to revise the results of the Second World War on the status of Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands. China's economic growth rate has averaged 10% per year since (1990), a clear indication that China will not be satisfied with the 'modest role' it was given in the region after World War II. China's demographic resource (1.5 billion people) and strong economic growth are the prerequisites that should ensure "the peaceful rise of China, the acquisition of the status of a world power without resorting to military instruments."¹

Japan perceives Chinese power as a challenge to its own security, and tries to contain China by creating an alliance with other states. The areas where the interests of the two countries clash are becoming wider. On the one hand, the San Francisco Peace Treaty created a platform for the peaceful resolution of problems. On the other hand, China has become a world power in a way it was not at the time this document was written. The problems that required a political solution for a long time were aggravated by trade disputes, as well as territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands and different views on the reintegration of the island of Taiwan with mainland China.

The analysis of the political situation in the San Francisco system is impossible without the methodological approaches that dominate international relations—the paradigms of realism (1940-1970); structural realism (1970-1998); non-classical realism (1998-2023); All these time frames are, of course, conditional, but meaningfully accurate. The listed methodological approaches are not sufficient for a comprehensive reconstruction of the picture of bilateral relations between China and Japan, and we, as far as possible, resort to a historical retrospective, an analysis of the domestic political situation in both countries, since they make a significant contribution to the development of the world economy and try to influence the formation of a new architecture regional and world security. Until recently, it seemed that in the global world only the role and importance of the economic and financial, informational, scientific and technical power of the country is increasing, and the role of the military component in determining the strength and influence of the state is relatively decreasing. The neoclassical paradigm will make certain adjustments to foreign policy and will push states to build up military power in the first place. After the crisis in the Taiwan Strait, during which the PRC conducted impressive naval maneuvers, the vector of public opinion in Japan has undergone significant changes. Anti-American protests in Okinawa subsided.

In 1996, the United States and Japan signed a Joint Declaration on a Security Alliance. Unlike the 1960 treaty, the document provides for interaction between US and Japanese forces in peacetime, during an armed attack on Japan, and in emergency circumstances. Japan pledged to provide the United States with comprehensive assistance.

Chinese political circles have expressed fears about the imbalance in the region and the increased involvement of Japan in US military plans. The strengthening of the US-Japan alliance is expressed in the

¹ A. Lomanov Political models and Sino-Japanese relations // China-Japan: competition for leadership (M., 2007), 22.

integration of Japan into the US global strategy in order to counter new threats, including those coming from China.

In 2005, the parties adopted a program document called "Common strategic goals". A number of provisions of the document directly concerned the Chinese side. Japan, as a strategic partner of the United States, is involved in containing China and, of course, is also interested in this.

US welcomes the transformation of the Japan Self-Defense Force into a normal armed force, but controls that Japan does not develop its own nuclear weapons. In 2007, the Washington-Tokyo-Canberra geopolitical triangle took shape, and despite all the denials made by the defendants, China is confident that the purpose of this formation is to contain Beijing. In the same year, Japan and Australia signed the so-called "Security pact". Japan and Australia intend to work out cooperation in peacekeeping and rescue operations. The parties undertake to provide each other with intelligence. China believes that, through Japan's initiatives, it is preparing to join the Indian triangle on the basis of 'democratic values'. The creation of theater missile defense, according to Beijing, is directed against China and not the DPRK. According to experts, it is clear that the range of North Korean missiles is not sufficient to hit targets in the United States or Australia.

On the one hand, Japan is concerned about the lack of transparency of China's actions in the political and military fields, and on the other hand, China is wary of Japan's desire to raise its international status. China would like to see a Japan that has an inferiority complex due to its historical past and no political weight other than that given by the US strategic partnership.

The political status of Japan does not correspond to its economic power, and this gives rise to many contradictions, both for Japan itself and for the whole region. This kind of Japanese desire creates problems in bilateral relations: Japan wants to both increase its international role and build friendly relations with China, and from the Japanese point of view, none of these political goals can be abandoned, while, according to China believes these goals are incompatible.

Compromise thinking is alien to Chinese political circles. The demonstration of force and two tools of non-interference in the internal affairs of the country and sovereignty protect the sphere of aggressive thinking and are the legal arsenal of non-democratic countries. China does not hide the fact that its goal is peaceful exaltation and, naturally, it has a need for domination. The problem, including for Japan, is whether the desire for dominance will upset the balance of power in the region and whether this will cause destabilizing inequalities. In this vein, one can consider the Japanese side's concern about nuclear weapons tests in China and India.

China, according to Japanese experts, is strengthening its surface and submarine fleets, modernizing them to a certain extent, and purchasing new military equipment. So far, the quality of personnel training leaves much to be desired, and "the use of the Kilo EKM-877 submarine is difficult due to the low training of Chinese crews." China is interested in acquiring destroyers to expand its influence "in the South China Sea and counter the Indian Navy."

Japan is also concerned about China's desire to 'monopolize' the Strait of Malacca, since this transport artery is strategically very important for Japan: a significant part of its oil imports pass through this strait. China, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh are actively cooperating in the field of ensuring the security of maritime transport routes in the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca.

Consequently, Japan and India, having significant grounds for concern, seek to create a counterbalance or cooperate in their efforts in this direction. China does not care about economic cooperation between Delhi and Tokyo, it is wary of the desire of Japan and India in the medium term to create mechanisms for cooperation between the US, Japan, India and Australia. China emphasizes that there are agreements between the US and India on nuclear issues. Cooperation with Delhi enables Japan to counter Chinese influence in the region. Otherwise, both Delhi and Tokyo should become members of the already "outlined" regional structure headed by China. If the Tokyo-Delhi alliance is formed, this will also affect the interests of Russia, since it has stated that it welcomes the development of trilateral China-India-Russia relations.

If India aspires, and it aspires, to further increase its economic power, then most likely it will opt for a high-tech partner such as Japan, since India's desire for know-how can be completely provided by it. If Delhi is ready for a 'cooling' of relations with Russia and liberation from the doctrine of non-alignment, then it is quite realistic to form an alliance of this kind without or with the participation of the United States, given India's military potential: fleet, air force, etc. Tokyo is closely watching China's transition from a land power to a maritime power and is calculating the risks to itself and to the region as a whole. China is seeking to protect the natural resources available in the South China Sea, potentially exacerbating the situation around Spratly and the Paracel Islands.

Beijing is improving the operational capabilities of its navy and air force so they can operate effectively over long distances. In his speech in Tokyo, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian said that China will protect the sovereignty of its national territory, airspace, territorial waters and its maritime interests, and uphold the country's security and independence. Tokyo rightly assumes that when Beijing talks about its maritime interests, it always means Taiwan. The exercise, conducted by Beijing to improve the ability of the fleet to operate in all weather conditions in the ocean, is seen by the Japanese side as an attempt to learn from the crisis in the Taiwan Strait and develop offensive rather than defensive forces. For its part, Beijing draws attention to the fact that with the help of new maritime legislation protecting Japanese rights in the special economic zone, Japan is striving to become a large maritime state. Only the land area of the country is small - 370 thousand km², and while together with the zone of maritime sovereignty it will be almost 4.5 million km², this will put it in sixth place in the world.

The offensively oriented military modernization of the Chinese armed forces is causing opposition from Japan in other neighboring countries, which may have a negative impact on China's economic development in the long term.

Beijing's diplomatic efforts cannot neutralize the 'potential threat' posed by China. Chinese submarines have violated Japanese waters more than once in recent years. But the PRC only admitted the violation in 2008 after Beijing was given readings from US radar and radar systems. Only after that did Beijing apologize to Tokyo. Calculating the risks to itself, Tokyo is concerned that modern technology "has a multi-purpose application and it is extremely difficult to determine what they intend to use in the military field and what in the civilian one." Therefore, "China's goal is to obtain military technology under the guise of economic exchange." Japan is very attentive to security issues, and when providing assistance and developing exchanges, it always considers how technology can be used. The Japanese side believes that the military threat in East Asia, especially in its southern part, remains, it has not been eliminated with the end of the Cold War. For Japan, China poses a military threat, has a significant impact on Vietnam, with which it has a large land border, or on those countries that are in territorial disputes with it.

In the event of economic and political chaos in China, Japan may face the fact that the administration of China's nuclear technology is out of control, as well as the migration of specialists with the appropriate experience, says the report of the Japan International Policy Institute. Tokyo, assessing the risks, doubts the potential of the ASEAN countries to create an effective security system in the Asia-Pacific region and prevent conflicts around Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, etc. in the event of an escalation of the situation. Japan aims to weaken the influence of China in the region and seeks to create an alliance with the democracies of India, Australia and New Zealand. If successful, Japan will have to agree to Australia's demands and remove the duty on agricultural products.

Japan and China compete in the region for spheres of influence, with Beijing still having a clear advantage in Central Asian countries. Beijing realizes its interests in the region through the mechanisms of the SCO. In the format of bilateral relations, China gives preference to Kazakhstan, insofar as it perceives it as the leader of the region. Beijing is interested in the energy resources of Central Asia and is trying to gain a strong position in this market. Japan, unlike China, is not yet involved in the affairs of the region, and it is not as active diplomatically as China, but the "declaration on the creation of the Silk Road"

(1997) through Central Asia and the Central Asia-Japan dialogue mechanism exist. China is more purposeful and proactive, while Tokyo has a reactive diplomacy style. Asymmetry in the face.

After the well-known incidents: "Nixon shock" and Bill Clinton's "three nos" warily analyzes the accents of the United States, insofar as Japan needs guarantees that the United States will fully take into account the interests of Japan. Japan fears that China's mediating role in the dismantling of the DPRK's nuclear program, provided by the United States to China, may nullify Japanese efforts in search of fellow citizens abducted by North Korean agents during the years of Kim Il Sung's rule.

During an official visit to Tokyo on April 11, 2007, Premier Wen Jibaov of the State Council of the People's Republic of China stated in a joint press release that: North Korean relations, is ready to provide Japan with the necessary assistance in resolving the problem. This is a very painful issue for Tokyo, since Japan assumes that it is in China's interests to eliminate Japan as a negotiator. As for the issue of Korean unification, neither China nor Japan is interested in this. The situation in the region may escalate if, in response to the North Korean threat, Japan creates a missile defense system. The only one who can 'dissuade' Japan from creating a missile defense system is the United States.

The non-transparency of China's military activities increases Tokyo's fears about its own security, as well as for its neighbors in the region. In the short term, it prefers bilateral ties, the US military presence in the region, and cooperation with US security structures. Japan is interested in maintaining and strengthening the Japanese-American alliance as a prerequisite for building normal Japanese-Chinese relations.

Tokyo assumes that the US will remain involved in Taiwan for a long time. Japan's ruling circles are not inclined to regard Clinton's "three nos" as a victory for Chinese diplomacy, although such an assessment prevails in the world. Tokyo sees this as an opportunity to save face for Beijing.

Japan positions itself as the biggest ally of the US and will build its relationship with China with this in mind. Could Japan be in the role of being an outsider? If the US and China go so far in their relationship that there will be no room for a US-Japan alliance.

Japanese experts are considering such a scenario for the development of events in the medium term. Japan, 'trying on' the role of a 'friendly' outsider, will help build relations with the United States and China, which will help it develop relations with China. If the situation in China changes, and compromise thinking prevails in the Chinese elite, or a generational change occurs, Chinese students from Western countries return, and China recognizes Japan as an equal partner, according to Japanese experts, it will be possible to build productive Japan-China relations. In the medium term, Tokyo will have a constant and difficult dialogue with Beijing, Japan will focus on developing relations with China, while studying the trends that will arise in relations between the US and China. There is another way. If Japan refuses to "together with the United States defend Taiwan", a short-term positive effect may occur, but China has other 'wishes', and it is unlikely that Tokyo is ready to satisfy them always and in full. It is difficult to define the line on what terms Tokyo supports the US desire to contain China, and to what extent it is ready to pay for the risks. According to Chinese experts, Tokyo simply hopes that there will be no conflict between the US and China.

For the Chinese elite, Japan's long-term direction is also unclear. Beijing hopes that Tokyo will come to terms with China's leadership and find its niche in the regional security system on the mainland's terms. "Japan can follow the example of Great Britain, choosing only partial participation in this regionalization, it can take a cooperative approach towards China," Chinese political scientists predict. Regarding the European Union, the analogy is not entirely successful. Despite the contradictions in certain issues, in the EU as a whole there are no prerequisites for a military confrontation with each other. "Democracies don't fight democracies." There is a danger of conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region.

The future of the European Union is also unclear in the long term, there is a deep conviction that the desire of the European Union to some extent 'enclose' itself from the rest of the world and create, to a certain extent, an oasis of common prosperity and conflict-free will sooner or later end in disintegration.

The APR in its composition is a region much more complex and not of the same type than the European Union. It will be difficult for Japan to fulfill the role of Great Britain in the Asia-Pacific region for the time being. There is a high degree of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, and if China dominates, i.e. the Sino-centric system will be implemented, what tools does China have to maintain peace and stability?! What is the degree of trust in China?! Will it take into account the national interests of the countries of the region, when the democratic countries have difficulty or not at all, despite compromise thinking? The answer is most likely no.

The Chinese intellectual elite are encouraged by the rapid growth of the economy and confidently declare that Japan is in a prolonged economic recession and that China will surpass Japan in the future. The Chinese market, according to experts, is quite open, capable of absorbing goods and investments, supplying labor-intensive and technical products. China is able to invest its capital in neighboring countries. Enthusiastic optimism, not accompanied by serious analysis. What if the global economic situation changes? What if there are ethnic conflicts in China? Should Beijing decide to use military force against Taiwan? If investors, under the influence of various reasons, re-invest their capital, is the national capital ready to support the high growth rates of the Chinese economy?

China is no longer faces the threat of the disappearance of the state, as at the beginning of the 20th century, and the main challenges do not come from Japan, but from within the country.

Japan's desire to elevate its status and become a permanent member of the UN Security Council is facing stiff resistance from China. According to the LDP expert group ("Ozawa Committee"), "the UN charter still contains a provision for a "hostile state", which allows for discriminatory treatment of Japan. The first thing Japan should do to strengthen its position in the UN and initiate the reform of this organization is to get the support of UN member countries in order to eliminate this provision. This issue will definitely come back after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as there are proposals to reform the UN. Of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, the US supports Japan's aspirations to become a permanent member, but without veto power, while Russia supports Japan's aspirations wholeheartedly. China will use veto power and block Tokyo's efforts. In Beijing, many believe that the disease of friendly exchanges must be overcome, since the blame for the tension in bilateral relations lies solely with Japan and the United States.

Chinese policy in the medium term will not undergo significant changes in relation to Japan. China has a one-party system of government, and this, to a certain extent, gives stability to the Chinese vector. Tokyo's foreign policy remains more or less stable as a consensus has been reached among the Japanese political elite in accordance with the economic strength of the country's political status. Beijing does not perceive Japan as the main threat in terms of regional security. Lianhe Zabao of the Center for US Studies at Fudan University believes that in an ideal situation, China could recognize Japan's status as a great power in exchange for its support for China's peaceful rise, while both countries could cooperate with the United States in economic and security strategy. China could use the "engagement strategy" with Japan that the United States is using with China to bring Japan into the system of international relations on favorable terms for her.

To implement such a paradigm, 'it remains' to find out only the position of the United States. If the US is going to leave Southeast Asia, then the scenario does not work and China will adjust its model. If the US remains a transatlantic power, the attraction of other regional players into the alliance is inevitable, and China in this case must give up its desire for dominance, etc. And Tokyo's position on this issue has a different emphasis: Japan's role will not be to concentrate its diplomatic efforts on developing a balance of power between the US and China.

Instead, Japan should maintain the Japan-US alliance while moving into a strategic dialogue with China in order to contribute to the permanent transformation of the order in the region.

წყობილობა - primary sources:

1. *Asia Times*. 24.02.2005.

2. *Chinese Journal of International Studies*. 2006. №1
3. *The Daily Yomiuri*. 17.06.2007.
4. *Treaty of San Francisco 1951*. <https://rhgavmf.ru>
5. www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/texts/unclos/unclosr.pdf
6. www.zaobao.com
7. Yoshida's Letter to Dulles. Text of Letter from Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to Ambassador Jon Foster Dulles, dated December 24, 1951, released to press January, 16, 1952. *Far Eastern Survey*, 1952, 21(4).
8. Доклад «Роль Японии в международном сообществе», подготовленный экспертной группой ЛДП. («Комитет Одзава»). 1991 г./ *Бунгэй синдзю*. Апрель 1992.
9. *Правда*. 10.10.1949.
10. Доклад японского института по изучению международной политики. «Модернизация вооруженных сил Китая и японо-китайские отношения» / Семин А.В. *Японо-китайские отношения: состояние, проблемы и тенденции (конец XX- начало XXI века)*. М., 2008.
11. *აპზონა-ჩინეთის ერთობლივი კომუნიკე პრესისათვის* (ტოვო.11 აპრილი 2007წ.)// <http://www.people.com.cn/31520/5602753.html>,
12. *産経新聞* 12.09.1996.

ბიბლიოგრაფია - Bibliography:

1. Lobell, S.E., Ripsman, N.M. Taliaferro, J.W. (eds). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and the Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
2. Rous, G. Neoclassical realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. *World Politics*, Vol..51 №1. 1998.
3. Ogata S. Normalization with China. *Comparative Studies of U.S. and Japanese Processes*. University of California, Berkley. Institut of fast Asian Studies, 1998.
4. Кунадзе, Г.Ф. Япония и Китай бремя: «особых отношений». *Японский калейдоскоп*. М., 2006.
5. Кутаков, Л.Н. *Внешняя политика и дипломатия Японии*. М.: И-во Международные отношения. 1964.
6. Мак-Клейн, Дж. Л. *Япония от Сёгуната Токугавы - в XXI в век*. М.: АСТ, Астрель, 2006.
7. Нелидов В.В. «Китайский шок Никсона» в зеркале японской внутренней политики. *Вестник МГИМО*, 20196 №12(6), 61-77.
8. Семин, А.В. *Японо-китайские отношения: состояние, проблемы и тенденции (конец XX- начало XXI века)*. М.: Институт Дальнего Востока РАН. 2008.