RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE: THE LOGIC OF THE REGENERATION OF TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURES

Abstract

The author analyses the development of anti-Ukrainian propaganda and attitudes in Russia. He emphasises that this process was accelerated by a weak reaction of the international community concerning the Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008; fear of the “colour revolutions”, and the Kremlin’s unacceptability of Ukraine’s integration within the European Union; increased ambitions after the annexation of Crimea, which was reflected in “Novorossiya” project. Furthermore, the Rus- sian government put much effort into creating the image of “the Enemy” from the West and labelling Ukrainians as Nazis.

According to the author, western experts dedicating more attention to the plutocratic nature of Russia overlooked the growing influence of “Power agencies” (Siloviki) in governance. The West ignored Russia’s totalitarian roots, expressing optimism based on prospects of democratic “transitol- ogy” while the clouds of war were gathering gradually.

The regeneration of totalitarian society is not taking place only in Russia, and the author briefly indicates other post-Soviet examples as well. However, the essay focuses on Russia, underlining the “geopolitical mentality” of its leadership. Additionally, the author considers Putinism as an ideology which aims to restore complete control over society and discredit the idea of reforms. According to the author, this ideology is eclectic and populist.

The key word of this essay is “totalitarian syndrome”. The author explains where and how it man- ifests itself in Putin’s Russia. Interestingly, Putin’s version of totalitarianism does not derive from the revolutionary party’s ideology, as it establishes “from above”, and compared to the communist variant, it is the “secondary”. Emphasis is made on privatising institutions of violence and the government’s alliance with the criminal world.

The author expresses a strong interest in the reaction of Russian society, establishing that, gener- ally, a significant part of the population is vulnerable to propaganda, and adaptation to state violence is deeply rooted in public culture. All of the above mentioned serves as a precondition for wars. The author concludes that, during his life, the Russian Federation has been at war for 26 years, and it still is.