

# ევროპული და ატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების და უსაფრთხოების უსაფრთხოების და რუსეთის წინააღმდეგ რუსეთის წინააღმდეგ

EUROPEAN AND TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND THE  
RUSSIA'S WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

ოლენა პოდვორნა

აღმოსავლეთ ევროპის კვლევების ინსტიტუტი,  
ბერლინის თავისუფალი უნივერსიტეტი

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## რეზიუმე

ესეი განიხილავს, თუ რა გავლენა მოახდინა 2022 წლის 24 თებერვალს უკრაინის წინააღმდეგ დაწყებულმა რუსეთის ომმა ევროპული და ტრანს-ატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების წესრიგზე და როგორ პასუხობენ ევროკავშირისა და ჩრდილო-ატლანტიკური ალიანსის წევრი ქვეყნები არსებულ გამოწვევებს.

ავტორი აღნიშნავს, რომ 21-ე საუკუნეში ევროპული სახელმწიფოები, ევროკავშირი და ზოგჯერ ამერიკის შეერთებული შტატები აქტიურად იყენებდნენ საერთაშორისო ურთიერთობებში ნეოლიბერალიზმის/იდეალიზმის, ინსტიტუციონალიზმისა და კონსტრუქტივიზმის მიდგომებს. მსოფლიო აქცენტს აკეთებდა „რბილ უსაფრთხოებაზე“. შედეგად, ჩრდილოატლანტიკური ხელშეკრულების ორგანიზაციამაც (NATO) კი, თავის მთავარ ფუნქციად პოლიტიკურ დიალოგსა და არასამხედრო საფრთხეებზე მუშაობა განსაზღვრა. კლასიკური ხისტი უსაფრთხოების პრობლემების აღორძინება რეგიონში წარმოუდგენლად მიიჩნეოდა. რუსეთის მიერ უკრაინის წინააღმდეგ დაწყებულმა ფართომასშტაბიანმა ომმა და უკრაინის წინააღმდეგობამ გამოიწვია ევრო-ატლანტიკური ქვეყნების უსაფრთხოებისა და საგარეო პოლიტიკის სტრატეგიების განახლება და უსაფრთხოების სისტემების ცვლილება.

ავტორი განიხილავს ევროკავშირისა და NATO-ს წევრი ქვეყნების მიერ გამოყოფილი დახმარების მნიშვნელობას და ხაზს უსვამს აშშ-ის, პოლონეთისა და გაერთიანებული სამეფოს როლს როგორც სამხედრო, ასევე ჰუმანიტარული დახმარების მხრივ. აგრეთვე, საუბარია გერმანიის როლზე, მის რუსეთთან არსებულ წარსულ ურთიერთობებზე და იმაზე, თუ როგორ შეაფერხა ყოველივე ამან გამოწვევაზე მყისიერი პასუხის გაცემა. მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ ევროკავშირში ერთ-ერთ მთავარ გავლენის მომხდენ ქვეყნად გერმანია მიიჩნეოდა, სწორედ ვაშინგტონის მტკიცე პოზიციამ მოახერხა ევროპის ქვეყნების კონსოლიდაცია უკრაინის მხარდასაჭერად და რუსეთის აგრესიის საპასუხოდ. მხოლოდ სამი ქვეყნის – აშშ-ის, გაერთიანებული სამეფოსა და პოლონეთის ერთიანმა ძალისხმევამ გამოიწვია NATO-ს, ევროკავშირისა და გერმანიის პოლიტიკის მნიშვნელოვანი ცვლილება.

ავტორი აღნიშნავს, რომ უსაფრთხოების წესრიგი, ძირითადად, მისი ნორმატიული საფუძვლები, მოითხოვს სერიოზულ გადახედვას. უკრაინის და ზოგადად, რეგიონის ქვეყნების მომავალი უსაფრთხოების უზრუნველსაყოფად მასში მცირე ცვლილებების შეტანა საკმარისი არ იქნება. ექსპლიციტურად და გასაგებად უნდა განიხილებოდეს ის მექანიზმები, რომლებიც უპასუხებს რუსეთის მიერ წამოჭრილი უსაფრთხოების დილემას, განსაკუთრებით ბირთვული იარაღის არსებობის კონტექსტში. უკრაინას აქვს პასუხი ამ გამოწვევაზე: რუსეთის ფედერაციის დაშლა, დემილიტარიზაცია და დენუკლიარიზაცია. ხოლო როგორ აპირებენ ევროპული ქვეყნები და ამერიკის შეერთებული შტატები ცენტრალურ და აღმოსავლეთ ევროპაში არსებული უსაფრთხოების დილემას უპასუხონ და ევროპასა და ევრო-ატლანტიკურ სივრცეში უსაფრთხოება უზრუნველყონ, ჯერ კიდევ განხილვის საგანია.

The outbreak of premeditated, unprovoked, and brutal Russia's war against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 has severely shaken the security environment of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region. The international community was forced to face the fact that modern international order is not sustainable enough, existing mechanisms do not work properly, the international law is regularly violated, and nuclear weapons ban can be overridden. International institutions failed to ensure international security, and the UN Charter principles were brutally breached. Unimaginable full-scale war in Europe has become a bitter reality triggering a serious range of challenges and threats that could destabilize the entire world. The security system we got used to undergoes critical changes and needs severe revision. In this context the international community has entered a time of uncertainty, in which the range of known threats are combined with new ones (from geopolitical rivalry to the AI challenge), making the entire security environment quite complex, demanding updated and improved regulations and mechanisms.

The major task actors of international relations have faced referred to the ensurance of both national and international security. Security is a basic need of every state in the international arena. Each state perceives ensuring security as a major goal of its security and foreign policy. However, states differ in their security thinking and practices. Post-bipolar period of the development of international relations has granted the international community with a broadened and widened understanding of security. In theoretical domain security studies have advanced largely by numerous contributions of constructivists, and in particular, of Copenhagen school. States, in their turn, have also transformed their security practices, trying to address a range of soft security issues. The established consensus in the European/Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century was appealing to neoliberalism/idealism, institutionalism and constructivism approach in international relations, widely practiced by European states, the EU, and sometimes - by the US. The world seemed to be preoccupied by threats associated with soft security, especially those from a societal/humanitarian/ecological domain. In the result, even the North-Atlantic Alliance has put a major role in its functioning to a political dialogue and addressing non-military threats in a constantly changing security environment. Classical hard security threats coming from military conflicts have been believed impossible to occur in the European/Euro-Atlantic region, which is highly institutionalized, and cooperation is based on a solid normative basis.

However, in the effect of the war the international community has acknowledged that Russia has become a most significant and direct threat to European and Euro-Atlantic security, which was confirmed, in particular, in a new NATO Strategic concept issued in June 2022<sup>1</sup>. The range of threats modern Russia represents stretches from attempts to rewrite its own and world's history, proposing to install its own version of historical events up to blackmailing the world with nuclear war. Trying to address the emerging security situation, world's leading actors have elaborated different approaches, though they are united in condemning Russia's full-scale war.

What should be stressed is the fact that Ukrainian resilience and readiness to fight for its own country considerably influenced the policy of leading world's actors towards Ukraine. At the same time, it became obvious that policy towards Ukraine and Russia is connected to security order in the European/Euro-Atlantic space and ways of ensuring. Each country in the Euro-Atlantic region initiated updating its security and foreign policy strategies. A discussion about reshaping the European and Euro-Atlantic security system has been installed. Hard security is back to the European and Euro-Atlantic agenda, together with fears about remilitarization of the area. Security dilemma in the region is associated with Russia. Ongoing discussions about appropriateness of different responses to the security dilemma can be equal to the discussions about future security order in the European/Euro-Atlantic zone.

The outbreak of the war has been shocking to the European countries and organizations, which has displayed a delayed, and often slow reaction to the emerging situation and new security conditions. A unified Western approach Ukraine has hoped for was absent. Instead, a number of countries took a lead in addressing the Russian threat: the US, Poland and Great Britain. Apart from delivering the aid, they started exerting pressure on other countries, in particular Germany, but also on the European Union, and NATO. Additional pressure was exercised by Ukraine, personally by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukraine's diplomatic team. Ukraine's appeal for greater assistance to Ukraine together with strong military resistance has become a game changer towards Kyiv. The key message Ukraine was transmitting concerned interdependence of Ukraine's security and the European and Euro-Atlantic ones. Stances taken by London, Washington, and Warsaw have played an extremely important role in changing the entire atmosphere around Ukraine, putting Kyiv into the spotlight of the whole world. It became obvious that war in Ukraine may go beyond its borders, triggering a spill-over effect. These three countries used all their expertise on Russia and the region of Central and Eastern Europe to explain to their western partners the complexity of the situation, and its prospective outcomes if they deny assistance to Kyiv. First weeks and months of the war forced political elites in Western countries to reconsider their relationships both with Russia and Ukraine, and to upgrade their thinking about security in Europe in the 21st century and security practices.

Already half a year before the war, above-mentioned countries tried to voice worsening security conditions around Ukraine because of provocative Russian behavior that included military exercises and increase in military presence near Ukrainian borders. Being aware of a high probability of military escalation they simultaneously appealed for diplomatic track between Ukraine and Russia at different political and diplomatic meetings, but also were getting ready to deliver assistance to Kyiv if needed.

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1 NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/> (29.11.2022)

Poland and Ukraine share a common understanding of Russia and its ideas of redesigning the international order, especially taking into account the demand that NATO return to its 1997 borders (Meyer and Arkhipov 2021), as an existential security threat, therefore it was predictable that Poland would become the first country to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Being a frontline NATO country and having a bitter record of bilateral Polish-Russian relationships, Poland has turned to be a key logistical hub for weapons supplies and humanitarian aid. Warsaw serves as a linchpin of Eastern Flank security in the war in Ukraine. On March 29, 2022 the Pentagon declared that US troops in Poland were “liaising” with Ukrainian forces as they handed over weapons to them (Steward and Ali 2022). Such fast cooperation became possible, as Washington and Warsaw hold very similar positions towards security, especially a hard one, and towards Moscow, though Washington does not close its eyes on undemocratic practices the ruling Polish party has applied since 2015. In terms of the biggest donors of military aid to Ukraine, Poland has committed the third highest amount, behind the US and the UK. Till July 2022 Poland has committed to spending USD 1.81 billion in security assistance to Ukraine<sup>2</sup>. At the initial phase of the war Poland (together with some other partners) was supplying Ukraine with Soviet-legacy equipment that was immediately delivered to the battlefield. It was an interim solution that helped Kyiv to sustain, but it was not enough to become a game changer in the war, as such weapons are old-fashioned and unmodernised, additionally their stocks are limited in the West. Warsaw sent more than 200 T-72s, along with mobile artillery, drones and rocket launchers. Poland also donated air-to-air missiles for MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, portable anti-aircraft missile systems “Perun” and 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers<sup>3</sup>. At the same time, a certain amount of the provided security assistance is not available to the public, as Poland does not disclose details of most arms deliveries. Up to October 2022, the total cost of assistance provided by Poland is estimated to reach 0.49% of its GDP<sup>4</sup>. In October 2022, the EU formally established a military training mission for Ukraine (EUMAM) to last for a period of two years. Two headquarters, in Germany and Poland, will coordinate the training of 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers<sup>5</sup>. Warsaw also confirmed its commitment to supply vital defense aid as long as needed.

Poland sees military assistance to Ukraine as a guarantee of its own security and the security of Europe as a whole. At the same time, Poland holds quite a radical stance towards Russia, and the future security order in the European/Euro-Atlantic space, which is not shared neither by powerful European countries, nor by the United States. Such divergences have been visible since March, when Warsaw was constantly asking for a more robust NATO stance in the war. But even after a rocket attack against Poland that resulted in the death of two civilians on November 15, 2022 hasn't led to NATO's actions as perceived according to its founding documents. Though immediately after the attack Warsaw was claiming an increase of its military readiness and asking for consultations under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty (Lister et al. 2022). In its turn, Ukraine was stating that a rocket was fired

2 Poland ranked third in the world in military help for Ukraine: BBC. TVP World. 2 July, 2022. <https://tvpworld.com/61077440/poland-ranked-third-in-the-world-in-military-help-for-ukraine-bbc> (29.11.2022)

3 Special Capitals: What Europeans do to support Ukraine. EURACTIV. 2 May, 2022 Accessed 29 November 2022. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/special-capitals-what-europeans-do-to-support-ukraine/> (29.11.2022)

4 Ukraine Support Tracker. A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine. Kiel Institute for the World Economy. <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/> (29.11.2022)

5 European Union Assistance Mission Ukraine. European Union External Action. <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2022-11-EUMAMUkraine.pdf> (29.11.2022)

from a Russian territory. In the effect of consultations Poland has declared that an investigation into the explosion would be carried out. At the same time, Western leaders agreed that Moscow was to be blamed for a strike against Poland that had been a result of missile attacks against Ukraine. Warsaw also announced that it was a single act, and there was no evidence of further missile strikes<sup>6</sup>. This case has clearly shown that Western leaders try to preserve existing security order in the European/Euro-Atlantic space trying to avoid its disbalancing and any direct military conflict with Russia. At the same time, they continue to support Ukraine. It is worth noting that the very next day Ukraine has mitigated its statements about the Russian rocket against Poland<sup>7</sup>. There are some speculations that the so-called Polish case can result in an increase of arms supply both to Poland and to Ukraine, to protect at least its Western part. At the same time, Warsaw used the war to substantially transform and upgrade its own military capabilities and resilience pledging to spend 5 percent of its GDP on defense from the current 2.4 (Karnitschnig and Kość 2022).

Apart from military assistance, Warsaw has largely articulated Ukrainian interests in Europe and in the transatlantic region, pushing Ukraine's integration to the EU and NATO. Working on consolidated support for Ukraine's EU membership bid, Poland argued that it would considerably strengthen European and Euro-Atlantic security. Additionally, Poland was stating that the decision of Ukraine's membership would have a symbolic effect demonstrating that the war cannot become a barrier to a settled Ukrainian choice to become a part of the European and Euro-Atlantic democratic community. Warsaw continues to support Ukraine by discussing how to provide security guarantees to Kyiv during and after the war with Russia. Warsaw stands for prolongation of the sanctions regime against Russia and visa ban for Russians to enter the EU. On September 19, 2022 Poland banned Russians from entering the country via land, sea and air (Sieniawski 2022). Warsaw also calls for an expulsion of Russia from international organizations and other formats of multilateral cooperation.

Warsaw also takes a lead in addressing soft security threats caused by the war, as Poland Poland is the key reception country for Ukrainian refugees. According to the UNHCR, 7,867,219 refugees from Ukraine are recorded across Europe. 4,751,065 of them registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe. In Poland – 1 507 893 (last updated 22 November 2022)<sup>8</sup>. In a response, on June 28, 2022 Ukraine has granted a special status to Polish citizens residing in Ukraine, providing them legal and social guarantees<sup>9</sup>. At the same, such extreme levels of hospitality and public support for Ukraine serves as a solid footing for an Alliance between them<sup>10</sup>, which

6 Duda: To nie był atak na Polskę. Rakieta nie była w nas wymierzona. rp.pl. 16 November, 2022. Available from: <https://www.rp.pl/konflikty-zbrojne/art37424781-duda-to-nie-byl-atak-na-polske-rakieta-nie-byla-w-nas-wymierzona> (29.11.2022)

7 Ukraine definitely did not send missiles to territory of Poland, participation of Ukraine in work of investigative group should be ensured – President. President of Ukraine. Official website. 16 Novemebr, 2022. <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-tochno-ne-sprymovuvala-raketi-na-teritoriyu-polshi-79197> (29.11.2022)

8 Operational Data Portal. Ukraine Refugee Situation. The UN Refugee Agency. Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org) (29.11.2022)

9 ЗАКОН УКРАЇНИ “Про встановлення додаткових правових та соціальних гарантій для громадян Республіки Польща, які перебувають на території України”. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Legislation of Ukraine. 28 July, 2022. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2471-20#Text> (29.11.2022)

10 Joint statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Secretary of State of the United Kingdom. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. 17 February, 2022. <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-ministra-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrayini-derzhavnoyi-sekretarki-velikoyi-britaniyi-ta-ministra-zakordonnih-sprav-respubliki-polshcha> (29.11.2022)

can prospectively make them an influential actor in the European arena after the end of the war, and Ukraine's access to the EU.

The United States of America being an anchor of the Euro-Atlantic security and the main security provider in the world, has steadily stood for the independence of Ukraine. Washington has become the leader of the anti-Russian coalition and the main provider of political, diplomatic, and military assistance to Ukraine. In total, the United States has committed more than \$19.7 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden Administration, including more than \$19 billion since February 24<sup>11</sup>. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than \$10 billion in security assistance for training and equipment to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO<sup>12</sup>. Additional military assistance is given on a regular basis. Among the most significant U.S. decisions towards Kyiv the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022<sup>13</sup>, second lend-lease in its history, should be mentioned. The document eases the process of granting Ukraine required arms, and defense articles. The Act was signed on May 9, 2022, which also has a symbolic meaning, targeting historical Russian narratives. The US agreed to Kyiv's request for HIMARS multiple-rocket launchers, which allowed Ukrainian forces to hit deeper behind Russian lines while staying out of range of Russian artillery. The first delivery of HIMARS took place in late June 2022.

Also, the United States works closely with their Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. Thanks to the firm and persistent stance of Washington, it became possible to consolidate European countries in solidarity with Ukraine and in counterstand of Russia. The United States has established a platform in support of Ukraine, known as the Ramstein format (Brzozowki 2022). To date, six Ukraine Defense Contact Group meetings have taken place. The Ramstein format ensures comprehensive and systematic work on granting Ukraine rapid security assistance according to its needs and developments in the battlefield. Widely recognized as more efficient than cooperation with NATO.

Additionally, the United States is the largest single-country donor of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Washington has already provided nearly \$653 million in humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in the region since 2014, including nearly \$302 million this year<sup>14</sup>. The United States together with its Allies and partners has also initiated an unprecedented range of sanctions and export controls on Russia<sup>15</sup>.

Great Britain has emerged as one of the closest partners and allies of Ukraine in this war, though their bilateral relationships were declared as strategic in 2008, and later - in 2020 - reconfirmed<sup>16</sup>. His-

- 11 Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine. U.S. Department of Defense. 23 November, 2022. <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/23/2003120409/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE%20FACT%20SHEET%2020221123.PDF> (29.11.2022)
- 12 United with Ukraine. U.S. Department of State. 21 October, 2022. <https://www.state.gov/united-with-ukraine/#supporting-ukraine> (29.11.2022)
- 13 Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022. Congress.gov. 9 May, 2022. Available from: <https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ118/PLAW-117publ118.pdf> (29.10.2022)
- 14 United with Ukraine. U.S. Department of State. 21 October, 2022. <https://www.state.gov/united-with-ukraine/#supporting-ukraine> (29.11.2022)
- 15 The Impact of Sanctions and Export Controls on the Russian Federation. U.S. Department of State. 20 October, 2022. <https://www.state.gov/the-impact-of-sanctions-and-export-controls-on-the-russian-federation/> (29.10.2022)
- 16 Political issues between Ukraine and Great Britain. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. <https://uk.mfa.gov.ua/en/partnership/881-ukrajina-velika-britanija/592-political-issues-between-ukraine-and-great-britain> (29.11.2022)

torically Britain has problematic relationships with Russia, but they were severely downgraded during the last two decades, starting from assassination of A. Litvinenko. The similar understanding of security London shares with Washington, combined with Brexit, allowed Great Britain to play its own game in competing Berlin and Paris while addressing the security dilemma evoked by Russia. Additionally, the new security environment has proven constant Britain's appeals towards an increased military resilience of Europe, which has never come true. Britain together with the United States warned the EU of its enhanced energy dependence from Russia, pointing it would harm its security. These concerns were widely rejected by Brussels and Berlin, but proved to be correct after the outbreak of the war, when Moscow began using its energy instruments to exercise pressure on its European partners. Together with Poland, the UK has become a partner in the Alliance announced by Kyiv in February 2022, before the war.

Respectively, when the war erupted Great Britain took a unique, extremely strong position in the Western Europe supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia. London managed to become an advocate of Ukrainian interests in the West, changing the thinking of the Western decision-makers about prospects of the war. London is perceived in Ukraine as a partner that was creating a window of opportunities for Kyiv in the military sphere in the first weeks and months of the war. It should be underlined that military cooperation between two countries was established in 2015. Under Operation Orbital, the British Military provided training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (at least 18 000 soldiers)<sup>17</sup>. Not surprisingly, the UK has offered to launch a major training operation for Ukrainian forces after the outbreak of the war, with the potential to train up to 10,000 soldiers every 120 days<sup>18</sup>. Such training could fundamentally change the equation of the war, ensuring the Armed Forces of Ukraine have the resilience they need to be victorious in their fight for enduring peace.

As the second largest donor, the UK has committed £2.3 billion in military assistance to Ukraine thus far and has made a pledge to match that assistance in 2023<sup>19</sup>. Alongside Washington and Warsaw, London declared it would continue to supply vital defensive aid for Kyiv as long as needed. Though Boris Johnson became a personalized symbol of Britain's comprehensive support to Ukraine, consecutive prime-ministers after his resignation, reconfirmed his commitments. Additionally, the UK has sanctioned more than 1,200 people and over 120 businesses since Putin's invasion of Ukraine<sup>20</sup>.

In the effect of joint efforts of Ukraine, the US, the UK and Poland substantial changes occurred in the policies of NATO, the EU and Germany as the most powerful European state. When it comes to NATO and the EU, the major problem refers to finding a consensus among its members on certain issues. The experience of 2014 and the following years wasn't very encouraging. However, this time Brussels has shown more solidarity and cohesion in addressing new security threats and challenges. Both organizations constantly increase and broaden the spectrum of the assistance given. The EU provides support predominantly in the political, diplomatic, and humanitarian sphere. Since the

17 Defence Secretary announces extension of UK training mission to Ukraine. Gov.UK. 04 November, 2019 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-extension-of-uk-training-mission-to-ukraine> (29.11.2022)

18 UK to offer major training programme for Ukrainian forces as Prime Minister hails their victorious determination. Gov.UK. 17 June, 2022. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-offer-major-training-programme-for-ukrainian-forces-as-prime-minister-hails-their-victorious-determination> (29.11.2022)

19 Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion. UK Parliament. House of Commons Library. 9 November, 2022. <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/> (29.11.2022)

20 UK sanctions collaborators of Russia's illegal sham referendums. Gov.UK. 26 September, 2022. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-collaborators-of-russias-illegal-sham-referendums> (29.11.2022)

Russian aggression started, the EU and its financial institutions have mobilized around €19.7 billion to support Ukraine's overall economic, social and financial resilience in the form of macro-financial assistance, budget support, emergency assistance, crisis response and humanitarian aid<sup>21</sup>. Following the European Council meeting of 20-21 October 2022, the Commission has proposed an unprecedented support package for Ukraine of up to €18 billion for 2023<sup>22</sup>. The assistance is given also via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, this includes life-saving supplies such as medicine, food, and shelter items, but also strategic equipment like fire engines, power generators, ambulances and mobile hospitals<sup>23</sup>. As totally unique a decision to activate the Temporary Protection Directive<sup>24</sup> to offer quick and effective assistance to people fleeing the war in Ukraine should be perceived. Such a decision could be also viewed as a preventive measure to avoid a larger humanitarian crisis and its consequences to EU security. As the EU is a soft security provider in the region, the Commission has proposed to set up the Rebuild Ukraine Facility<sup>25</sup> as the main legal instrument for the EU's support, in the light of future reconstruction.

Military assistance measures have been provided under the European Peace Facility, amounting to €3.1 billion, that will be used to reimburse Member States for their in-kind military support to Ukraine<sup>26</sup>. By such a decision the EU has broken its long-standing taboo in its defense policy, which should be also viewed in the light of changes in thinking about security and practices applied.

On June 23, 2022 the EU granted candidate status to Ukraine together with Moldova<sup>27</sup>. Kyiv applied for it on February 28, 2022. An acceleration accession process was introduced to bring Ukraine closer to European institutions, simultaneously demonstrating to Russia that Europe wouldn't leave Ukraine alone. Additionally, European and Ukrainian diplomacy worked hard on agreeing tough sanctions packages against Russia<sup>28</sup>. To date (November 2022) eight packages of restrictive measures against Russia were adopted. Though they are heavily criticized both in Ukraine and in some EU member-countries for their partial and deferred effect. Hungary constantly objects to sanctions calling to abort them. Banning some Russian banks from the SWIFT network is considered one of the prominent achievements of these packages so far.

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- 21 Commission proposes stable and predictable support package for Ukraine for 2023 of up to €18 billion. European Commission. 9 November, 2022. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_6699](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_6699) (29.11.2022)
  - 22 Commission proposes stable and predictable support package for Ukraine for 2023 of up to €18 billion. European Commission. 09 November, 2022. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_6699](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_6699) (29.11.2022)
  - 23 European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Ukraine. European Commission. [https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/europe/ukraine\\_en](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/europe/ukraine_en) (29.11.2022)
  - 24 Ukraine: Commission proposes temporary protection for people fleeing war in Ukraine and guidelines for border checks. European Commission. 2 March, 2022. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_1469](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1469) (29.11.2022)
  - 25 Ukraine: Commission presents plans for the Union's immediate response to address Ukraine's financing gap and the longer-term reconstruction. European Commission. 18 May, 2022. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_22\\_3121](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3121) (29.11.2022)
  - 26 The European Peace Facility. European Union External Action. November 2022. [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/EU-peace-facility\\_November2022.pdf](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/EU-peace-facility_November2022.pdf) (29.11.2022)
  - 27 Ukraine. EU membership application. European Council. Council of the European Union. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/> (29.11.2022)
  - 28 EU sanctions against Russia explained. European Council. Council of the European Union. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#sanctions> (29.11.2022)



Additionally, the European Union undergoes its own transformation, as it has to reconsider bilateral relationships with Russia, its approaches to ensuring security of its members. Recognition of Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism could be treated as a powerful sign of a change<sup>29</sup>. Though the European Union concentrates predominantly on a domain of soft security, it has tightened cooperation among its members within its Common Security and Defense Policy, and with the North-Atlantic Alliance.

The North-Atlantic Alliance is the major security guarantor in the European and Euro-Atlantic region. The new security developments and radical transformation of the security in Europe, together with Ukrainian requests for help, forced NATO to react. The stance the Alliance took clearly manifested that it would protect only its members. However, NATO promised to provide assistance to Ukraine at the political, diplomatic, and military level and it's constantly increased in accordance with Ukrainian ability to defend itself and the continuation of the Russian aggression. Already since 2014 cooperation has been intensified in critical areas. After the 2016 NATO Summit the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) was designed to support Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security and to implement wide-ranging reforms based on NATO standards, Euro-Atlantic principles and best practices. Correspondingly, at the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, Allies agreed to strengthen the CAP and to boost NATO's long-term support to Ukraine and to provide Kyiv with immediate, short-term, non-lethal military assistance<sup>30</sup>. At the same time, it should be underlined that NATO helps to coordinate Ukraine's requests for assistance and is supporting Allies in the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid. In this way, the Alliance respects the right of each Ally to decide which help each of them would like to provide. Respectively, individual NATO member countries send weapons, ammunition and many types of light and heavy military equipment, including anti-tank and anti-air systems, howitzers and drones, based on their own decisions. Allies also agreed to help Ukraine transition from Soviet-era equipment to modern NATO equipment, boost interoperability with Allied forces, and further strengthen Ukrainian defense and security institutions. Additionally, Allies work with relevant stakeholders in the international community to hold accountable all those responsible for war crimes, including conflict-related sexual violence. With deliberation of occupied territories the number of such crimes constantly rises, demonstrating extreme levels of vulnerability and insecurity of civilians. In the longer term, the Alliance, together with the EU, is committed to assisting Ukraine and supporting efforts on its path of post-war reconstruction and reforms.

At the same time, NATO was heavily criticized for its slowness in taking decisions to support Ukraine, both by Kyiv and some of its member states. Apart from this, the most disputable issue between NATO and Kyiv still concerns the closure of the sky over Ukraine. The Alliance refuses to protect Ukrainian sky as it would be treated as direct military conflict with Russia. The Alliance tries to avoid the geographical broadening of the military activities, simultaneously being afraid of the nuclear escalation of the conflict. Above-mentioned so-called Polish case serves as a manifestation of a reserved stance of NATO. But this case will definitely force NATO to enhance strengthening of its eastern flank.

29 European Parliament declares Russia to be a state sponsor of terrorism. European Parliament. 23 November, 2022. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IPR55707/european-parliament-declares-russia-to-be-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism> (29.11.2022)

30 Relations with Ukraine. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 28 October, 2022. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_37750.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm) (29.11.2022)

However, the most problematic case in ensuring European and Euro-Atlantic security in the context of the war refers to Germany. Being a major mediator in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict since 2014 and the leading EU power, Berlin failed to elaborate efficient policy towards Russia, Ukraine and the security order in the region. Under its own historical burden and responsibility Berlin was constantly advocating for peace means in resolving any conflict, and escaping increase in defense spending at the national level. Germany was also cautious about forming the European Army, calming down Paris and London aspirations. The security should have been provided to Europe by NATO and the US, the same as to Germany. Additionally, Berlin has established a vast network of connections with Russian authorities, business and individuals, very often analyzing developments in the international arena through Russian lens. As a result, Berlin was unable to react as quickly as for instance Poland or Great Britain. Even more, according to the words of the former Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany Andriy Melnyk, some German officials were sure that Ukraine won't be able to sustain more than a few hours in a direct battle with Russian troops<sup>31</sup>. Incorrect perception of the security situation and false expertise on Russia and Ukraine have led to a considerable re-assessment of foreign and security policy of Germany, together with its Ostpolitik inherited from Willy Brandt and not updated in post-bipolar times. Russia's invasion against Ukraine also actualized issues of energy security and independence of Berlin, and forced it to radically change its defense policy, especially on the issue of arms supplies. Few days after the break-up of the war, Olaf Scholz stated that "President Putin has created a new reality, which requires an unequivocal response"<sup>32</sup>. But understanding of a new security reality and elaboration of new policies took time. In the first months of the war Berlin was heavily criticized both by Ukraine and some EU countries and the US for holding strong connections with Russia, also after February 24, 2022, and for the extreme slowness in taking decisions on how to address the war. However, the German government, in parallel with reconsideration of its foreign and security policies (Bunde 2022, 516), has gradually increased its assistance, mainly economic, civilian, political, and diplomatic.

Berlin supports Ukraine in close coordination with its partners and allies. The Federal Government provides lethal and non-lethal military support for Ukraine. It includes deliveries from the Federal Armed Forces, as well as supplies from German industry financed from the Federal Government's funds for so-called security capacity building. At the same time, Berlin increased its mandatory contributions to the European Peace Facility<sup>33</sup>. However, Germany faces the task to update its policy on providing heavy weapons to Ukraine, as stalemate on the front won't let Ukraine win, but will severely jeopardize European security.

Germany hosts the second largest Ukrainian refugee group after Poland (approximately 1 021 667 people<sup>34</sup>), providing legal, financial and humanitarian support on an unprecedented scale. Berlin

31 Ambassador says German minister was against helping Ukraine, thought it would fall within hours. The Kyiv Independent. 29 March, 2022. <https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/ambassador-says-german-minister-was-against-helping-ukraine-thought-it-would-fall-within-hours> (29.10.2022)

32 Policy statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag, 27 February 2022 in Berlin. The Federal Government. 27 February, 2022. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378> (29.10.2022)

33 Military support for Ukraine. The Federal Government. 23 November, 2022. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992> (29.11.2022)

34 Operational Data Portal. Ukraine Refugee Situation. The UN Refugee Agency. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/>

has agreed to the strong sanctions regime and to postpone its debt repayments and thereby to support the country financially. However, it took much more time to start supplying military equipment to Ukraine, in particular heavy weaponry. It's a constant dialogue between two parties, whose main aim is to convince German politicians in need to ensure military help to Ukraine so as to protect Europe and international security order.

Developments in foreign and security policy of Germany are perceived as revolutionary as they have actually challenged its traditions: Ostpolitik and adherence to peace means in resolving military conflicts. During his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2022 Olaf Scholz accused Russia of “sheer imperialism”, declaring to support Ukraine as long as needed<sup>35</sup>. Additionally, Germany advocates for a stronger and geopolitical European Union, which already serves as “antithesis to imperialism and autocracy”<sup>36</sup>. Berlin declared its readiness to take greater responsibility for European affairs, which means also ensuring security<sup>37</sup>. So we might witness the emergence of substantial changes in ensuring security order in Europe.

All above-mentioned actors expressed unprecedented levels of solidarity and provided extensive military support to ensure Ukraine's security and territorial integrity, and more broadly - security in the region and on the continent. But, security arrangements that were installed after World War II and redesigned after the end of the Cold war have shown their weakness and little credibility under conditions of a large-scale war between Russia and Ukraine. Correspondingly, the security order, mainly its normative fundamentals require serious reconsideration and revision to meet the entire spectrum of threats and challenges. It's already obvious that hard security cannot be ignored, when soft security is preferred. A working balance should be elaborated and implemented. A second issue corresponds to the respective institutions and binding instruments they could and should apply in case the security order is destabilized/endangered/violated/ruined. The issue is being currently addressed within the context of future security guarantees to Ukraine. However, the discussion is more comprehensive as it tackles the fundamentals of existing security order in Europe and Euro-Atlantic. It's not possible to provide security guarantees to Ukraine without reshaping the existing security environment. Minor amendments or application of standard formula won't ensure security. The discussion should address explicit and understandable mechanisms on how to address the security dilemma posed by Russia, especially in the context of nuclear arms possession. Ukraine has the answer to the question: to dissolve, to demilitarize and to denuclearize the Russian Federation. The question is how European states and the United States of America would like to address the security dilemma in Central and Eastern Europe, and consequently to ensure security in the European and the Euro-Atlantic space.

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ukraine#\_ga=2.53150696.1527742142.1669498526-833453344.1669498526 (29.11.2022)

35 “Our world has clear rules”. The Federal Government. 21 September, 2022. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/chancellor-scholz-un-2128398> (29.11.2022)

36 After the watershed. The Federal Government. 19 July, 2022 <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/after-the-watershed-2063256> (29.11.2022)

37 Germany must become ‘the best equipped armed force in Europe’, Scholz says. Euronews. 16 September, 2022. <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/16/germany-must-become-the-best-equipped-armed-force-in-europe-scholz-says> (29.11.2022)

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