Inga GHUTIDZE Professor Samtskhe-Javakheti State University Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia

From Tropological Speech to Stereotypes – Linguistic Peculiarities of Political-Militarist Narrative

Abstract: Political-militaristic literature provides important information on the military objectives of the country, the chosen political course, the national interests of the states, the history, the wars, the ongoing processes in today's world. This type of literature helps the reader to analyze existing conflicts and to get information on the interests and objectives of the states as well as on the people involved in these processes.

The basis for tropological speech is physical or cultural experience. Therefore, comparisons, epithets, metaphors change from culture to culture. One type of comparison, epithet, metaphor can have a different meaning and completely opposite expression in other culture.

The following paper deals with lexical units, comparisons, metaphors, epithets, derived from the Bible and mythology that give the artistic nuance to documentary literature: *salt of nation*, *the olive branch*...

If the XX Century was talking about the *Cold War*, today we have: *new cold war, silence war, moral war...* as well as the *diplomatic dice, the card of Abkhazia...* on the big political chess board.

The political-militaristic narrative in the modern world is a powerful tool to create stereotypes with a purposeful vocabulary, especially when the issue concerns a small, intricate geopolitical location and heavy economic and military capability of the country, such as Georgia. Faked stereotypes on Georgian, Abkhazian and Ossetian peoples, created by the Russians, are discussed in the following paper: *the other, the aggressor, deadly enemy...*

Keywords: Political Course, Military Objectives, Tropological Speech, Stereotype

Introduction

Militarism is propaganda of war, military power and violence through TV programs, films, books, political statements, toys, games, sports and similar means. Militarism is also directly related to the formation of public opinion about war; For example, when the economy plays a role in a military-industrial role, or national security issues dominates in domestic politics, militarism stipulates the political leaders' inability to use military power to solve a particular issue. If we look at history, we will assure that militarism has had a great impact on the evolution of society. The war is accompanied by a lot of trouble, but we can talk about the positive sides of the war, as it is manifested in the fact that during the war, people are more concerned about each other, society, contributing to the common well-being, demonstrating the greatest bravery and loyalty (Goldstein, *International Relations* 107).

K. Ninidze mentions in her book – *Morphology of Militaristic Narrative* – that the military service was considered excessive among other services in the Russian imperial entourage in the period of St. Petersburg. Military merit was considered a royal service and as noble act in contrast to civil service. Military officers also equated to a higher civil rank. Due to the fact, that the Russian emperors were also militaries, the military service was identified with power. Orders were of special importance in military service. It was not a matter of merit, but the knights' brotherhood whose members were united under the name of knightly and moral values (9).

Political-militaristic literature provides important information on the military objectives of a particular country, chosen political course, tells about the national interests of the states, the history of the wars, the ongoing processes in today's world. This kind of literature helps the reader to analyze existing conflicts and to get information on the interests and purposes of the states, about the people involved in these processes.

Georgia has always been a strategically important area for the whole world. Consequently, Georgians have always struggled with military and peaceful means for the preservation and independence of the country.

The battle has not ended up today. The Georgian people are still fighting for the inseparable parts of Georgia – Tskhinvali and Abkhazeti Regions. Not only Georgian and Abkhazian authors but also foreign researchers write about these conflicts. They are talking about the causes and results of the conflicts, but academic editions are small in number (Asmus 2010, Jojua 2007, Papaskiri 1998, Ninidze 2009, Goldstein 2013, Andersen 2014, Chomsky 1999, Nye 2003).

Tropological Speech

In ancient Greece tropes were studied by rhetoric. Aristotle's school considered rhetoric as an art of persuasion. Oratorical skill is the most important thing for rhetoric. Aristotle asserted that rhetoric is a method of convincing and the latter is always substantiation for something. It is important for people to know the methods and means by which they can convince others. Creating a favorable efficient approach to convince an audience was considered as a necessary factor by him (*Rhetorica* 33-35).

A metaphor is most frequently used from the types of tropological speech. Metaphor is studied by various fields of science. There are poetic and linguistic metaphors. They differ from each other as poetic metaphors are distinguished by artistic value and novelty, while the linguistic metaphor may be "living" and "outworn".

American linguist J. Lakoff and Philosopher M. Johnson consider the metaphor as a part of daily speech and actions. The conceptual system of a human being plays a central role in determining the everyday reality. If we agree that this conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then our thinking, experience and everything that we do daily are metaphorical. However, this happens to us unconsciously. Every day we do not think about metaphor and its use. This is the ultimate event of human life. To reveal this factor we should refer to the spoken language (*Metaphors We Live By* 4).

The most important thing is that the metaphor is not defined only in the field of language or vocabulary. The human mindset is largely metaphorical. Metaphors exist in people's consciousness and define it (*Ibid.* 6).

According to cognitive linguistics metaphors are divided into three groups: orientation, structural and ontological metaphors.

The basis for tropical speech is physical or cultural experience. Therefore, comparisons, epithets, metaphors change from culture to culture. One type of comparisons, epithets, metaphors in other culture can have a different, opposite meaning.

When speaking about international relations, states, conflicts and wars, usually the terminology, the vocabulary, characterizing for this area and, most importantly, causing no ambiguity, are used. In this kind of narrative, at first glance, the tropological means should not be met as it should provide precise information about war, conflict, for example:



Putin's Russia was becoming more **autocratic** and **nationalist**, and was greatly excited by Belgrade (Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World 105).

Biblical and mythological in political-militarist narrative

Political-militaristic literature is greatly owed to the Bible and mythology and it is not surprising, since they remain to be the source of any type of political and militarist literature. But in this case it is essential who writes the work, or whose order to be written it is. This is an important factor because the political-militaristic literature is small in number in Georgia and the world scientific circles are obliged to refer to the authors that have nothing common with scientific honesty and impartiality. There are also exceptions that do not falsify the history and real situation of the story, and allow us keeping an eye on this interesting process:

Fighting of David and Goliath

According to Ronald Asmus, on the night of August 7, at 1:44 pm, the president received a new intelligence report, by which 58th military units were going in Tskhinvali. This story was already worrying. This finally confirmed Saakashvili's suspicion that his country was invaded by Russia and the aggression plan was launched.

Saakashvili's decision to be involved in the war still remains a controversial issue, but the other issue is how Georgia could meet force with

force Russia, to use military force against it and to respond to a retaliatory blow.

It was necessary to define Russia's capabilities. Moreover, when the confrontation between the two countries was on the verge of war: "Started ... How do you feel Israel's fate or Palestine? – In the words of this message, some hopes were made that little Georgia could still win victory over Russia in this **fight between David and Goliath**" (*Ibid.* 40).

Georgia and Russia really resemble David and Goliath. Through this comparison, the reader is assured that the war between Georgia and Russia is not a war of strong states. Georgia is a small country. It had neither a strong and trained military army nor had the material possibility for war. More importantly, as the author notes, the main fourth battalion was in Iraq, and the rest of the army was allowed to break that summer. In this war Georgia had no relevant weapon. Therefore, with such a strong and large state as Russia, this fight is really like the fight between David and Goliath.

Salt of Nation

Russia blames the democratic world and hostile intentions of the nonexistent enemy for the catastrophic defeat of its international and domestic policy, on the background of aggressive policies and imperial ambitions. It was always so. Russia's attitude to neighboring states was always the same. The British Major Kent criticizes the Russians and calls the revolution a criminal. He mentions: "I would not like to blame your combat generals – my colleagues – for the death of Russia [...] I will point out only the facts. In every war the best sons of the fatherland always fall in action [...] **pride, color and salt of the nations** [...] those who protect their people and fatherland" (Andersen, *Abkhazia and Sochi: The Roots of the conflict 1918-1921* 177).

General Kent is characterizes by Russian fighters as pride, color and salt of the nation. This metaphor provides the importance of people, their fighting and self-sacrifice for the homeland. The best sons of the country protect their homeland, so they are proud of the whole nation. Color, because without it the subject is lacking esthetics. Color motivates emotions, moods in humans. It is salt, because nothing is tasty without it. In the Bible, salt is found in several places and has a different meaning.

When the Lord decided to destroy the sinful cities – Sodom and Gomorrah, Lord told Lot to get to the mountain to survive:

And when the morning arose, then the angels hastened Lot, saying, Arise, take thy wife, and thy two daughters, which are here; lest thou be consumed in the iniquity of the city [...] And when the morning arose, then the angels hastened Lot, saying, Arise, take thy wife, and thy two daughters, which are here; lest thou be consumed in the iniquity of the city. Haste thee, escape thither; for I cannot do any thing till thou be come thither. Therefore the name of the city was called Zoar. The sun was risen upon the earth when Lot entered into Zoar. Then the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven; and he overthrew those cities, and all the plain, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground. But his wife looked back from behind him, and she became a **pillar of salt**. (*The Holy Bible* 19:26)

"For every one shall be **salted** with fire, and every sacrifice shall be **salted** with salt. **Salt** is good: but if the **salt** have lost his **saltness**, wherewith will ye season it? Have **salt** in yourselves, and have peace one with another" (*The Holy Bible* 9:1001).

God's salt

"And every oblation of thy meat offering shalt thou season with **salt**; neither shalt thou suffer the **salt** of the covenant of thy God to be lacking from thy meat offering: with all thine offerings thou shalt offer **salt**" (*The Holy Bible 2:97*).

"Ye are the **salt** of the earth: but if the **salt** has lost his savor, wherewith shall it be **salted**? It is thenceforth good for nothing, but to be cast out, and to be trodden under foot of men" (*The Holy Bible* 5:962).

Here we should recall the Georgian figurative say: **do good and salt it**, which highlights the importance of salt – even needs mercy, charity, goodness need salt!

Salt is precious mineral because of its savings properties, it is also a symbol of stability and constancy. According to Moses law, offering conveyed to the altar has been salted as a sign of immaculateness.

Compared to the salt, the author emphasized the function of fighters, their duty to "keep" their country, to protect it from the enemy and be useful for the whole nation as salt. Well-being of the country depends on them, if they do not fulfill their duties and can't protect their homeland, they will become worthless as fresh salt, they will become useless as fresh salt to be thrown away and trample down.

Olive leaf

On August 7, 2008 the President sent his minister for reintegration issues Temur Iakobashvili, was sent to Tskhinvali trying to establish a direct link between Russia and so-called South Ossetian authorities. Saakashvili descended to the last hope of a diplomatic move and touched the olive leaf with them in order to avoid a full-scale war (Asmus, *op. cit.* 37).

The olive leaf is found in the Bible and is a symbol of hope. When God told Noah about the Flood, he told him to make the ark and brought the cattle into the ark not to become extinct their kind:

Thus did Noah; according to all that God commanded him, so did he. The waters of the flood were upon the earth... And it came to pass at the end of forty days, that Noah opened the window of the ark which he had made: And he sent forth a raven, which went forth to and fro, until the waters were dried up from off the earth. Also he sent forth a dove from him, to see if the waters were abated from off the face of the ground; But the dove found no rest for the sole of her foot, and she returned unto him into the ark, for the waters [were] on the face of the whole earth: then he put forth his hand, and took her, and pulled her in unto him into the ark. And he stayed yet other seven days; and again he sent forth the dove out of the ark; And the dove came in to him in the evening; and, lo, in her mouth [was] an olive leaf pluckt off: so Noah knew that the waters were abated from off the earth. (*The Holy Bible* 8:18)

Olive leaf, as we have mentioned above, is a symbol of hope and joy, and that is why the author says that the president touched the olive leaf with Russia and so-called South Ossetia, i.e. his last hope was to negotiate with the Russian and Ossetian sides in order to avoid a full-scale war.

Achilles Heel

"The Achilles heel of Georgia was still frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali" (Asmus, *op. cit.* 64).

"In the Trojan War Achilles was said to have died from a heel wound which was the result of an arrow—possibly poisoned—shot by Paris. The wound was not serious but it was the only area of weakness" (*Myths and Legends* 177).

Like Achilles heel, Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions are weak points and permanent pain of Georgia. Territorial integrity is one of the prerequisites for joining the EU, so until the Georgian people will not get back the lost territories, these regions will be Achilles heel for them.

Apple of Discord

The Western allies had to help Georgia and mediate to end the August war. Who would do this and who would begin to negotiate with Russia – was another issue.

Nicolas Sarkozy became a helper of Georgia. Nevertheless, the issue of Georgia was not the main subject of agenda for France. In general, the Black Sea region was not included in its priorities within the EU frame. One of the French senior officials clearly pointed out in private talks that Georgia would never be the subject of France's special interest, and what a little place did our country had in their priorities: "but our task is not to allow to be turned it into an apple of discord in the EU" (Asmus, *op. cit.* 210). What did they mean when Georgia was compared to the apple of discord?

It is clear that French authorities would avoid tensions with Russia due to Georgia. Therefore, it was important for the country to be careful. France should also have some assistance for Georgia, and at the same time, it should avoid disturbances with allied states. Because of that, France took a mediate position and did not allow Georgia to be turned into the apple of discord.

War and Metaphor

German military theorist and historian Karl Clausewitz said: "war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means; however, the war is a luxurious thing as the states should possesses a significant military and economic resource to be at war" (*Principles of War* 16).

If XX Century was talking about the *Cold War*, today we have: **a new cold war, a moral war, a spiritual war, a silent war** on the big political chess board.

Cold War

The *Cold War* was a bitter political and ideological confrontation, on the other hand, between the US and the other leading states of the West and, on the other hand, between the former Soviet Union and its satellites. "The cold war expressed the main content of international relations in the second half of the 20th century when there was neither war nor peace between two major poles of the world" (*Dictionary-Guide of Social and Political Terms* 333).

The confrontation between Georgia and Russia can be discussed as a *New Cold War.* "Russia has led a geopolitical struggle with confrontations and tensions. Between the two countries there was something like cold war for years" (Asmus, *op. cit.* 57).

Everything started in the 18th century when Georgia became a part of Russia. Since then, Georgians are still fighting to be free from Russian clutches. That is why these two countries are permanently confronted with each other, either verbally or forcefully, that can be considered as a sample of a *New Cold War*.

Moral War

The Kosovo crisis and NATO's humanitarian intervention are the obvious examples of **moral war**. The Kosovan Albanians were allowed to decide their status by referendum, which could have been completed by independence. Thus, the central government has strengthened the ethnic cleansing, which ultimately aimed to change the demographic structure of Kosovo in order to resolve the referendum in favor of Belgrade. Thus, the central government has strengthened the ethnic cleansing, which ultimately aimed to change the demographic structure of Kosovo in order to resolve the referendum in favor of Belgrade. NATO has initiated a humanitarian intervention to suppress these processes and smashed the vital facilities in the territory of Serbia.

Noam Chomsky in the book – *New Military Humanism* – cites Elie Wiesel's words: *Kosovo is a moral war*, Wiesel affirmed: "When the evil shows its face, you don't wait, you don't let it gain strength. You must intervene" (90).

Joseph Nay in his book Understanding International Conflicts notes:

Moralists support the idea that international politics is based on certain rules. The most important place among these rules is the state sovereignty. They do not have the right to break these borders. The national boundaries have a moral significance, since the state is a defender of the rights of people within its borders. Hence, respect for the sovereignty of the country means respect for each person [...]. (25-26)

The war was called *moral war* because the states themselves were morally obliged to engage in conflict and avoid negative consequences. The question is: is moral really decisive in their actions? As mentioned above, the international system is anarchical in the eyes of realists. Therefore, there is no morality. States are struggling for self-sufficiency, and in reality the interests of the country are hidden behind morals.

Spiritual War

The Russian-Georgian war in Abkhazeti has caused serious consequences in the religious sphere.

On July 11, 1811, the autonomous of the church was abolished in Georgia by the emperor's decision as well as catholicosate of Abkhazeti and Imereti in 1814. The process of russification of the Georgian church was started with these facts. Substitution of Abkhazian churchmen with Russians followed turning Islamic of the majority of the population, as locals did not understand Russian preaching. In some sense this was also a protest against the russification.

After the restoration of the autocephaly of the Georgian Church on March 25, 1917, the Caucasus Exarchate was established by the decision of the Russian Temporary Government and the Russian Orthodox Church.

Later, the Georgian Patriarch Kirion II received a letter from the Patriarch of Russia, where he condemned the restoration of autocephaly and considered it a pretext of dissidence. This is where the confrontation between the Orthodox churches of Georgia and Russia begins for the canonical territory. Because of this situation, Abkhazia became a place of **spiritual war**: That signalled the beginning of the conflict between the Russian and Georgian Orthodox Churches for "canonical territory". Under these circumstances, Abkhazia turned into one of the main theaters of the "**spiritual war**" (Andersen, *op. cit.* 165).

Silent War


And the reaction of the media and commentators is to keep silent, following the norms under which the war against laos was designated a "secret war" (Chomsky *op. cit.* 64).

N. Chomsky in the book – *New Military Humanism*, *Lessons from Kosovo* – based on the events of Kosovo, shows the real face of superpowers. The humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has killed many innocent people. The author criticizes the United States, its actions and ironically reflects the humanity of the modern world.

When the humanitarian crisis develops, the countries around the world have the following choices: 1. to act and to facilitate the escalation

of the disaster; 2. do not do anything; 3. try to reduce the disaster. The author cites the example of Laos. In the case of Laos, as well as East Timor, Washington's choice was second, nothing to do but to break out a silent war: "And the reaction of the media and commentators is to keep silent, following the norms under which the war against laos was designated a 'secret war'" (Chomsky 64). In the aftermath of the US bombing, lots of villages in Laos were destroyed and many innocent people were killed. The American interests did not include divulgence of this war, so the media, as the most effective means of dissemination of information, must have been silent. That's why the author has called this war **silent war**.

The war is inseparable from the force that can be:



Soft Power

The **Soft Power** is a well-established term in international relations. However, his metaphorical icon represents its importance and purpose.

The **Soft Power** is the form of an external political strategy by which desired result based on self-participation, sympathy and attractiveness will be reached. It differs from "hard power", which implies the use of force. This term was established by the American political scientist Joseph Nye, who says that **soft power** is the language and culture of the country, which plays a major role in international relations, acting directly or indirectly on world politics and business ties: «this aspect of power-that is, getting others want what you want-might be called attractive, or soft power behaviour" (60).

In the VII century, the Chinese philosopher Lao Tao said: "There is no weak and gentle creature in the world than water, but the water is able to split the coolest stone". The soft power policy helps the states to achieve the desired result without violence (www.wikipedia.org).

In August Russia brought significant military power to the Tskhinvali region. Not only did they occupy Georgian villages, but also the village of Kurta, which has been supported by Tbilisi, the alternative government of the Tskhinvali region. It was through this village that the Georgian side tried to solve the conflict peacefully. With a fascinating choice of so-called **soft power**. (Asmus, *op. cit.* 26)

One of the examples of **soft power** politics can be considered the autonomy offered by the separatists. This autonomy was so extensive that it was almost equal to independence. The case concerned with the establishment of local government, free economic zones, the protection of language and cultural identity. Only territorial integrity of Georgia remained unchallenged. (*Ibid.*)

Russia's actions can be considered as a model of **whip** policy towards Georgia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it is more outlined. Russia is trying to restore its influence on Georgia and the former Soviet Union. Because of this the situation in the region is more or less unstable, which hinders the development of the country and its orientation to the West.

The August war is an expression of force policy. The majority of critics point out that this war has also broken out towards the West: "Georgia was just a physical target, and so to say that the **political switch** was right to us" (*Ibid.* 237).

Games of the States

The actions of states in international relations often resemble the game. They make moves, cutting cards, betting, etc. Their ultimate goal is to win and defeat the opponent. It is therefore important to reasonably predict the possibility of a possible outcome, opponent and their ability to achieve the goal.

As J. Goldstein points out:

The game theory in international relations implies a process involving two or more players and chooses one of the few alternatives. Every combination gives certain results for each player. The results are expressed in material or intangible form. The game's theory aims to calculate the possible results of the game, predict the next move of the players, taking into consideration its advantages and alternate moves.

The game theory was intensively used in the 1950s, and by the 1960s the scholars tried to explain the possibility of launching a nuclear war between the USSR and the US. The moves made in any kind of game are the same as the decisions and results made in politics that could result in the warmongering.

"There are several types of game: Zero game, prisoner's dilemma, etc." (Goldstein, *op. cit.* 76)

Games with similar structures unite in certain categories that are often referred to metaphorically. The metaphor expresses the unique character of

the particular game, its qualities, and each such game clearly characterizes the international negotiations:

The Role of the Joker

The goal of Georgia was to join NATO, which will significantly increase the security of the country [...] several states were skeptical about involvement of Georgia in MAP. Among them was Germany. France was skeptical about it, but inside NATO itself, it played a **role of joker**. (Asmus, *op. cit.* 132-133)

In comparison to the Joker, the author showed that France had significant influence inside the alliance, as Joker is the most powerful in the game. Therefore, France's proximity to joker is very clear, showing the leadership of this country and the influence of France for NATO's future plans. Although France was skeptical towards Georgia, it was an important force in its hands and if wanted was able to give an opportunity Georgia to join the MAP program.

Hidden cards

When Georgia decided to be a member of NATO, as it is noted above, there was a difference of opinions among member states: "As for the US, it **hid the cards** – did not fix its position. The US tried to act covertly and did not use any public pressure to achieve consent to Germany or any other country" (*Ibid.* 141).

Card of Abkhazia

On March 5-9, 1956, a protest rally, organized by the Georgian population, was crushed in blood by the Soviet Union's Armed Forces and Special Forces. Tbilisi Events might have been perceived as possible prospective model of the socio-political movement in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries by Khrushchev and his encirclement. These events caused fear of imitating and repetition in other republics in the Soviet leaderships. Therefore, the main purpose of the Soviet Union's leadership was to punish Georgia with a **drawing card of Abkhazia**, with effective encouragement of Abkhazian ethnocracy and separatism.

After the collapse of August Putsch in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin came to Russia, but neither relations with Georgia changed, and nor the **Abkhazian card** crashed in the trash of history. On the contrary, the new Russian government has deepened ties with Abkhazian ethnocracy (Jojua, *Abkhazeti in 1938-2006: Aspects of Regional Historical Process* 156).

The ongoing processes in Georgia and the war in Abkhazeti especially attract international attention. Russia is trying to restore the former Soviet Union and actively breaks up the territorial integrity of Georgia by provoking the Abkhazeti conflict. So today, the **card of Abkhazeti** is an important strategy for Russia to achieve its goals.

Turkish card

The separatist parliament of Abkhazeti sent the first official request to the Russian Supreme Council on March 23, 1993 and the second appeal on voluntary entry of Abkhazia into the Russian Empire on April 16, 1995.

Pro-Turkic Camp, headed by K. Ozgan, was based on the Gudautian group of Abkhazian ethnocracy. He was pro-Turkic orientation and was impartially standing on the independence platform of Abkhazeti due to the absence of a common border between Turkey and Abkhazeti. V. Ardzinba enjoyed this situation. In parallel to the pro-Russian orientation, the **Turkish card** was also instrumental ... He simultaneously killed two birds with one stone: somehow "blackmailed" Russia and, on the other hand, balanced the pro-Turkish interests of the Abkhazian ethnocracy and the Muslim population. (*Ibid.* 218)

Kosovo Card

The more the West sought to reach an agreement on granting independence to Kosovo, the more Russia opposed to. The West wanted to prove that Kosovo's case was unique and could not create any precedent for international law. If the US, Russia and the EU agreed that Kosovo was indeed an exceptional case, it would indeed remain, but Russians did not want to play with such rules. Moscow tried to gain influence over the West by using the **Kosovo card**. (Asmus, *op. cit.* 112)

Diplomatic dice

In the most critical period of the August war, Tbilisi decided to cast a **diplomatic dice** and be upon the die. Saakashvili thought that unlike

Putin Medvedev would be more facile and could make an agreement with him and expressed more readiness for peace initiatives. (*Ibid.* 175)

The dice define the next move of the player. Fate of his game depends on the casting a dice. That's why Saakashvili's dice can be considered as the endeavour. Talking to Medvedev could bring good results and find the outcome of the situation.

The fact that the metaphor of the game is actively used in the international system, is obvious with Russia's actions. As R. D. Asmus points out, "from time to time Moscow took pride in spurning the rules of the game – for example, it did not hide how garrisoned additional troops into the separatist region" (27).

The metaphors that we discussed above clearly show the nature of the international system. The nature of the states is based on the daily activities of the human being and its experience. In our case the game is one of the means of entertainment, where the cards, dice determine the player's fate, remaining lost or wins. Even in politics, possessing important strategies, the power determine their success, only in one contrast: the game here is not a fun but a significant process of self-preservation.

Stereotype of the enemy icon in a political-militarist narrative

The enemy icon is one of the most important ideological tools. In the Russian Empire in the 19th century, the enemy icon was identified with Muslim countries. National and liberal rebellions within the empire, as well as the world political challenges revealed instability of monarchical, feudal and imperial society. In order to justify stagnation that the Russian Empire suffered in this direction, the need to put "others" in the wrong for internal problems had high priority. This "other" could not have been a Western European country that was competing with it for having priority. The "enemy", who successfully would fulfill the tasks for this role in the ideological struggle, became Muslim Turkey, Iran and the North Caucasus.

The enemy icon is changing between oral and literary discourses. It contains duplicate and lubricated social dispositions. For example, in the 1840-50s it was associated with hostile forces in Eastern Georgia Shamil and Lezghians. (Ninidze, *Morphology of Militaristic Narrative* 44)

However, there is another situation in Russia today. The country's government chose an anti-western path and tries strictly abstaining from it. By doing so, it tries to emphasize his power and dignity. That's why the

West has become an enemy of Russia, which contradicts its interests. Asmus points out: "Moscow has continued to create an 'icon of coming enemy' from the West that promotes Russian propaganda" (Asmus, *op. cit.* 249).

The icon of enemy became the leading instrument of Abkhazian ideology in the conflict of Abkhazeti. Abkhazian separatists have been trying to establish an autonomous republic, to separate from Georgia and Georgians. In order to achieve this, ideological weapons were used, and they were trying to end the alliance with Georgia.

The tragedy of Abkhazeti was prepared by the Communist leadership for the last 4 decades.

It was exactly from Moscow that many generations of leaders of Abkhazian national-separatist movement who did everything and achieved that the Georgian was no brother and friend, but the **deadly enemy** in the eyes of Abkhaz, that "deprives" of the homeland and all the historical perspectives. It was possible to stir up anti-Georgian hysteria exactly by the Russians' encourage». (Papaskiri, *Abkhazeti is Georgia* 193)

Establishment of a separate church in Abkhazeti, the denial of common history with Georgians, origin caused the alienation of Abkhazians and Georgians became "others" for them. This distinction has made Georgians to be considered as enemies.

Separatists carried out the war emphasizing the ideological and psychological aspects of it and created the **icon of enemy** from Georgians. «The only way to survive from genocide was the "Patriotic War" with the strongly defined purpose for their fighters – protecting the native land of Abkhazeti **"From Georgian Aggressors"** and surviving Abkhazian nation from physical destruction» (Jojua, *op. cit.* 181).


Defending Georgia's national interests in Abkhazia was under double pressure, and those who dared to out-talk would become an **enemy of the Abkhazian people.**

On the other hand, intense, rampant propaganda took place in the West by scholars hired by Russians. They wrote that Georgians did everything to make Abkhazians as aliens on their land. Assessments towards the Georgians are very hard while speaking about the last days of the communist regime in the late 1980s and the national identity policies and testifying a priori the anti-Georgian sentiments and references that have no common neither with the science nor the reality:

Since the late 1980s Georgian nationalists have tried to show Georgia as the Christian's outpost, Christian island in the sea of aggressive

Muslims. The mass media and propagandists of the first Georgian nonformal political associations unambiguously characterized Abkhazians as **Muslims** who were loyal to other anti-Georgian forces under the Green Flag of Islam. (*Bielaia kniga Abkhazii* 15)

This trend was especially strong for the Abkhazians as "others" during the governance of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990-2) (Shnirelman, *National identity and myths of ethnogenesis in Transcaucasia* 58).



In the modern world, the political-militarist narrative is a powerful tool for creating stereotypes when dealing with territories and conflicts. When it comes to the small, difficult geopolitical location and economic and military capabilities of the country, such as Georgia, it gains more importance. Obviously, what are the processes, but print academic editions are scarce in international languages where the objective situation is reflected. Russian, Abkhazian and Ossetian propaganda, ruled by them, not only make Georgians aware of the above-mentioned stereotypes, but also try to bury relationships of Georgian and Abkhazian, Georgian and Ossetian peoples in the fraudulent stereotypes on them.

Conclusions

Thus, the examples discussed above show: 1) the importance of the language of political-militarist narrative where every lexical unit has a special meaning; 2) political and militaristic artistry and the war, strength and types of bet, given by this creative language, are obvious and interesting; 3) it is obvious the process of interesting stereotypes creation with the means of tropological speech happening before our eyes, aimed at delivering short and desirable information. They should work for a long period of time and justify the objectives of the states, which in certain cases imply total falsification of history.

Bibliography

- Andersen, Andrew, *Abkhazia and Sochi: The Roots of the conflict 1918-1921*, Toronto, Asteroid Publishing, 2014.
- Aristotle, Rhetorica, Edited by W.D. Ross, OCT. Oxford UP, 1959.
- Asmus, Ronald, D., A Little War That Shook the World, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Chomsky, Noam, *The new military humanism-lessons from Kosovo*, London, Pluto Press, 1999.
- Clausewitz, Carl von, *Principles of War*, Translated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942.
- Goldstein, Joshua, International Relations, New Jersey, Pearson, 2013.
- Jojua, Dazmir, *Abkhazeti in 1938-2006: Aspects of Regional Historical Processs*, Tbilisi, Universali, 2007, [In Georgian].
- Kodua, Eduard and oth., *Dictionary-Guide of Social and Political terms*, Tbilisi, Logos Press, 2004, [In Georgian].
- Komissia po pravam cheloveka i mezhnatsionalnym otnosheniiam Verkhovnogo Sovieta Respubliki Abkhaziia, *Bielaia kniga Abkhazii, dokumenty, materially,* 1992-1993, Moscow, Svidetelstva, 1993, [In Russian].
- Lakoff, George, Johnsen, Mark, *Metaphors We Live By*, London, the University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Lordkipanidze, Mariam, "Nekompetentnost' v rang istiny?", *Zaria Vostoka*, 21 July, Tbilisi, 1989, p. 3, [In Georgian].
- Lordkipanidze, Mariam, *Abkhazy i Abkhaziia*, Tbilisi, Ganatleba, 1990, [In Russian].
- Myths and Legends, Tbilisi, Bakur Sulakauri Publish House, 2014.
- Ninidze, Ketevan, *Morphology of Militaristic Narrative*, Tbilisi, Intellect, 2009, [In Georgian].
- Nye, Joseph, Understanding international conflicts, New York, Longman, 2003.
- Papaskiri, Zurab, Abkhazeti is Georgia, Tbilisi, Parnavazi, 1998, [In Georgian].
- Shnirelman, Victor, "National identity and myths of Ethno-genesis in Transcaucasia" in *Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 48-66.
- *The Holy Bible: King James Version, containing the Old and New Testaments, New York, American Bible Society, 1999.*