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Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the Aftermath of Soviet Nationalities Policy

Dissolution of the Soviet Union was a remarkable event of international magnitude. Death of the socialist giant transformed the world order permanently, deeming Russia incapable of holding the title of a ‘great power’. If for seven decades, the Communion of Socialist Republics represented a dangerous rival for the West, in 1991 its fall became imminent. Heavy-handed leadership and one-party system of the Soviet Union was efficient in establishing an economically competent and superior military state. However, the success was grounded in violent purges, absence of freedom of speech and ruthless elimination of divergent opinions. When Gorbachev’s Perestroika attempted to introduce ‘democratic values’ in the system, the accumulated inconsistencies broke out into light and corroded the basis of the empire. Historians have been trying to come up with a workable list of explanations for the extinction of the Socialist giant, including economic downfall, weak leaders, international pressure and democratization. This paper gives due credit to all the above suggestions, but places primary emphasis on the question of nationalities. It argues that the ideal of ‘socialism in one country’ was in and of itself incompatible with the reality of Soviet federation, becoming the central reason for the dissolution of the Union precisely in the period of Perestroika.

It is no secret that Gorbachev’s policy was a catalyst for the demise of the Soviet Union. Geoffrey Hosking, a leading historian on Russia and the Soviet Union, divides Perestroika in two stages. The first stage introduced democratic principles, and was cosmetic in nature: labor discipline was tightened up, criminal investigation for corrupt officials was hastened, sale of vodka was restricted and economic acceleration rather than deep-seated restructuring was stressed1.

Khruschev’s policy of ‘socialist legality’, aimed at bringing an end to Stalinist excesses, was further reinforced by Gorbachev’s pravovoe gosudarstvo (Rule of Law), endorsing law-governed state rather than state-governed legislation2. Overall, these adjustments were not particularly threatening since they did not undermine the backbone of the Soviet system. The second stage, in contrast, incorporated more radical measures such as the introduction of free elections and informal civil organizations. It was exactly Perestroika ‘part two’ that contributed to the rapid deterioration of Soviet valor. The Communist Party was systematically cleansed of its old members, while anti-Communist opposition was allowed to thrive owing to Gorbachev’s pol-
icy of Glasnost dedicated to increased transparency and freedom of speech. In The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Union, John B. Dunlop suggests that Gorbachev’s reforms “revealed the unresolved tensions between the ‘will of people’ asserted through competitive elections and the ‘will of party’ deeply embedded in Marxism-Leninism”. Perestroika was directly responsible for weakening and weeding out the two ideological and institutional bonds that held the unitary state together, namely Marxism-Leninism and the Communist Party.

The primary question is why Gorbachev decided to implement changes that were so risky. Considering his dedication to Marxist-Leninist ideals, his role as a reformer is surprising to say the least. In the light of his background, it is unlikely that he intended to transgress the ‘givens’ of the Soviet Empire, or to consciously discredit the socialist path. It is more sensible to assume that he hoped to reform and upgrade the languishing Soviet system in order to keep abreast of ‘the international standards’ pertaining to a modern state. The Soviet Union was lagging behind the other world powers due to its economic downfall in the aftermath of the Cold War and the stagnation associated with Brezhnev’s era. The Stalinist model of economy centered around military spending could no longer facilitate sustainable development. It strictly discouraged political spontaneity, initiative or creativity, representing a hindrance for the innovation essential for keeping up with the developing west. Besides, deteriorating economic situation in Eastern Europe started to act as a heightened economic burden for the country. The educated strata was pessimistic about the future of the Union, and ‘even the enforced mask of socialist realism, with its optimism at all costs, could not hide it’. Old Soviet leadership, with unimaginative and inflexible approach, could not address the established circumstances in a proper way.

Gorbachev put forward a refreshing idea of ‘updating’ the system in line with the Western standards, to create a post-colonial superpower. The ‘Perestroika project’ was a good instrument for garnering popular support during the process of reformation since it appealed not only to the Soviet society, but also to the Western world. However, Robert Strayer explains that democratization turned out to be challenging — unlike Southeastern Europe and South America, the Soviet Union exercised ‘an unparalleled degree of state control and the almost total absence of a civil society’. Adoption of liberal values entailed discrediting terror and violence, which for decades represented the foundation and binding force of the system. When political control waned, the population was already prepared to exploit the opportunities offered by Perestroika. International atmosphere also assisted the transforming public attitude. Later, when the existence of the Union was jeopardized, it was too
late to fall back on terror for stitching the falling parts together—the momentum for change was already unleashed. Gorbachev was not in the position to resort to bloodshed, both practically and ideologically. Built by Stalin’s iron hand and sustained by his successors, the Soviet Union collapsed not only as a result of economic problems and rising nationalism, but because of the lack of despotism that Gorbachev’s era allowed. The empire could no longer be transformed into a democratic state since its bedrock was the unlimited power of one party. Gorbachev’s reforms and his ‘failure only sealed a more general failure of communist regimes—their inability to build a modern state’.

While Perestroika served as the last straw in the dilapidated Soviet system, the population’s readiness to take up the opportunity to fight back deserves due attention. It can be argued that the Soviet ‘brotherhood’ was essentially nondemocratic and unfit for ‘liberalization’. Wisla Suraska suggests that Gorbachev, in his desire to keep up with the historical and political developments of the time miscalculated the system’s capacity to adapt to liberal politics. Since the decisions were made only by the powerful, the system was developed to reach its most convenient form without much consultation with the masses. With social interests deemed as uniform, no separate institutions prevailed to develop a civil society based on the genuine needs of the people. Authority vested in one party made it not only easy, but also tempting, to abuse the overwhelming power at hand. Legislative, executive and judicial powers were merged into ‘council democracy’, removing legal restrictions on political control. Central planning allowed a direct access to any kind of resources without legal or financial responsibilities attached. The final constituent of this patrimonial regime was uninterrupted fortification of traditions. Perestroika eroded the traditional structure without introducing a sensible substitute. When Gorbachev realized that these revolutionary changes would bring down the whole Union it was already too late, almost nothing was left to protect.

In addition to the ideological incompatibility of the new reforms with the Soviet political structure, Gorbachev did not plan out the process carefully. His chief mistake was the commencement of multiple reforms at once, instead of mending each part separately. He proceeded to simultaneously introduce democratization, dismantle the centrally planned economy, tackle with nationalist upheavals on the outskirts and sustain the status of a superpower in foreign affairs. These reforms kept degenerating the ‘administrative-command system’ without instituting a working economy and an effective democratic policy. A leading Soviet historian, Ronald Grigor Suny, argues
that open criticism of the Soviet Union inspired by Glasnost eliminated the last remnants of credence in Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Juan J. Linz and Alfren Stepan further attribute the failure of Gorbachev’s initiative to the fragility and non-existence of the five arenas essential for constructing a democracy. Civil society, although existent, promoted the idea of a nation-state rather than democracy, leaving no opportunities for the integration of non-Russian group. Democratic opposition was not fully supported by Gorbachev himself and thus, did not possess the necessary operating power. Moreover, the democratic opposition and civil society did not harmoniously complement each other. Finally, the economy was too frail to withstand the transformations and curbed the process of reformation.

There was a collective readiness for change, an overall longing for a liberal ideology that emerged in the 1960’s and progressed vigorously for the next three decades. Massive urbanization triggered an obvious proliferation of educated individuals who, in the words of John B Dunlop, were ‘considerably less easy to indoctrinate and to mobilize than the largely rural, uneducated masses of Lenin’s and Stalin’s time’. Brezhnev’s rule, accompanied by decaying socialism both domestically and internationally, further illuminated the need for new standards. Masses gradually started to doubt the miraculous potential of socialist values so vigorously propagated by official sources. The Soviet Union proved itself incapable of equipping its citizens not only with a high standard of life, but also with basic utilities for existence. Gorbachev’s reforms were designed to on the one hand, democratize the country relative to the West, and on the other hand, to keep up with the ideological transformations of local populations. Yet, his neo-Leninism did not possess the ideological fervor crucial for inspiring the modernity-oriented elites, who found it insufficient to only moderately reform the system. Granted the freedom of expression, representatives of the new elites found themselves upholding Western democratic principles. Mushroombing of informal underground organizations laid the foundation for civil society, which soon developed into an agent capable of expanding independently. By the end of 1980’s, this parallel form of civil society adopted the role of an ‘intermediary’ between state and society. The mood of radical political change was soon taken up by popular fronts in the Baltic region, Georgia, and Moldova, which started to form strong nationalist and separatist movements.

Some theorists suggested that Soviet socialism was doomed from the start because of its maximalist nature. The author and main propagator of the theory, historian Martin Malia, claims that the system demanded absolute transformation of human consciousness from individualistic to communal, which also involved annihilation of private property. However, as Robert
Strayer writes, this was an ‘impossible dream of utopian social engineering that flew in the face of both history and human nature’\(^\text{14}\). The primary endorser of socialism, the Communist Party, had to resort to deception to create the reality promised to the citizens. To build socialism free of obstacles, the Party had to exercise absolute control over political, social and economic issues, jeopardizing the very idea of communism. The incompatibility of reality with the illusionary world built by the ruling party rendered the system vulnerable to free speech. Glasnost and Perestroika, along with structural failures, divulged the impotence of the leadership to ensure good life via just means. Respectively, collapse of the system resulted in little to no resistance on both administrative and societal levels.

Geoffrey Hosking corroborates the theory by suggesting that the central problem of the Union rested in the utopianism employed as the ‘ideological adhesive to hold the system together’\(^\text{15}\). The system managed to survive for so long by eliminating all forms of political opposition and self-expression—the circumstances incapacitated the formation of civil organizations who could voice people’s concerns. This constituted the major strength of the system.

Once strict control over political opposition was loosened, the involuntary character of the union became obvious. Rise of nationalism in the union republics directly stemmed from Gorbachev’s policies. The breakdown of centralized authority incited to the explosion of nationalist creed, which in turn heightened national self-determination of the states and contributed to the demolition of the regime. Some historians, like Wisla Suraska, argue that Gorbachev distorted the perfectly functioning nationalist policies of the Soviet Union. Suraska suggests that the particular alignment of borders in the Soviet Union ‘ensured permanent conflicts between neighboring ethnic groups, thus rendering unlikely their collusion against the center’\(^\text{16}\). Furthermore, Gorbachev jeopardized the authority of local elites whose interest were previously taken into consideration. Determined to eliminate local power structures, he purged the system of national elites, replacing around nine-tenths of high-level posts in the government and three-quarters of top positions in the administrative regions and republics\(^\text{17}\). The local power base was replaced with officials who were primarily Russians. In Helene Carrere d’Encausse’s words, by combating localism Gorbachev managed to ‘form his own teams throughout Soviet territory’\(^\text{18}\). These actions were meant to prevent the establishment of a reliable national authority that could lead people. The frustration caused by the distortion of local hierarchy prevailed over the strained relations between ethnic groups. Moscow became the foremost enemy culpable for suppressing political and social identity of the union republics.
Overall readiness for change, as well as the numerous freedoms acquired through Glasnost and Perestroika provided the necessary instruments for challenging the idea of a single Soviet nation. Paying attention to individual needs and characteristic features of different nationalities was an integral part of the Soviet policy. Gorbachev fully shared Lenin’s determination to integrate all nationalities in the Soviet Union. The goal was to create a sense of comfort that would override the desire for autonomy or independence. However, his disposition was more condemning than welcoming—he condemned non-Russian nationalities for benefitting from the economic and social advantages secured by Russia without contributing to the common good. Non-Russian republics were blamed for ‘national favoritism’ for preferring local officials to more ‘competent’ Soviet professionals, who as already mentioned, were usually of Russian or Slavic origin. The reproachful attitude alienated other nationalities and made them hostile towards the idea of common good. In the republics where national consciousness was quietly nurtured throughout the communist period, and especially during Brezhnev’s era, Gorbachev’s words were interpreted as Russian chauvinism.

Helene Carrere d’Encausse, who is an ardent critic of Gorbachev’s policies, argues that Gorbachev had only a vague understanding of what was going on internally in the republics, which is clearly illustrated by his failure to properly respond to the crisis in Nagorno Karabakh, unrest in Tbilisi and Baltic republics. ‘Gorbachev and his top aides could barely tell the difference between an interethnic conflict and a riot in front of an empty store’ by the end of the 1980’s, she adds. This ignorant disposition is believed to have led the underestimation of peripheral conflicts. Although Gorbachev tried to stay consistent with Lenin’s policy of nationalities, by replacing local cadres he impaired the center’s ability to timely respond to territorially remote problems.

In his work, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, John B. Dunlop promotes intensified Russian nationalism of the 1980’s as the main explanation for the dissolution of the union. He suggests that Gorbachev, disoriented by growing national movements, decided to undermine Russian nationalism and strengthen ‘Soviet Patriotism’, which went against the traditional ‘Russia first’ agenda. Advocates of Russian superiority were dissatisfied that their self-expression was restricted—Russia’s superiority as the ‘eldest brother’ was established for decades. Many ‘democrats’ and ‘neo-Stalinists’ felt like the new policies transgressed their national dignity and this letdown was a good enough reason to cease supporting Gorbachev. Distrust at home and turbulent situation abroad rendered Gorbachev a failed reformer, whose authority was weak enough to be vigorously opposed. His
acknowledgement as an incompetent leader was sufficient to unleash disobedience and separatism both at the center and the periphery.

One of the gravest encumbrances of Perestroika was the multinational nature of the Union. By the late 1980’s, in the words of Robert Strayer, the country ‘contained an enormously diverse population within which lay many ‘nations in the making’22. Even though Lenin and the first socialists denounced Tsarist methods of rule, in reality the Soviet Union was built on the remnants of the Tsarist Empire—including autocracy and absence of free economy. Over a hundred ethnic groups, with diverse cultures and languages, bound together under the leadership for Russia, were waiting for the right moment to assert their own interests.

Beyond the shortcomings of Gorbachev’s policies, there was an inherent inconsistency in the ideological claims of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the diversity of the Soviet peoples was valued and on the other hand, their localism and inability to fully integrate was criticized. Starting from Lenin, self-determination of the Soviet states was ascribed an indispensable value due to its democratic nature. However, it was only perceived as a transitional path until final unification into a whole—socialism could not allow the independence of singular states.

Most of the nations in the Union had been under foreign domination even before uniting under socialism. They did not have the opportunity to develop their national cultures and national elites enough to resist the process ‘Sovietization’—their national consciousness was not strong enough to put up a vigorous fight for self-determination. Despite its international character, socialism emphasized national and ethnic distinctions, forging national identities in the process. The primary characteristic of Soviet multiculturalism was its emphasis on cultural peculiarity. During the first decades, national culture became more accessible to the majority through the development of education system, local language and grammar, establishment of publishing houses, etc23. Cultural progress reinforced national identities, while hierarchy between political units kept national consciousness of autonomous and semi-autonomous republics alive. Robert Strayer suggests that national groups were granted concessions in regard to self-expression to erode their suspicions and gain their support24. The process was called Korenizatsiya or nativization: native officials were allowed to establish national elites and were equipped with flags, courts, etc. Education also played a decisive role in the formation the national consciousness. Lenin’s reforms encouraged the education of national groups in their native languages, which in turn ensured immunity against Russification. Stalin realized that the policy would reinforce national identification rather than weaken it. He abandoned the project and
proclaimed Russian as the dominating language, a compulsory skill necessary to function in the Soviet society on an average level. Nevertheless, the remaining national identifications that lasted throughout the existence of the Union (Passports emphasizing national identity, education in native language) led to the accumulation of national sentiments.\textsuperscript{25}

Marxism proposed different socialist countries uniting under one doctrine and 'the Leninist line of 1913-17 could only be interpreted as contradicting the fundamental internationalism of Bolshevik ideology, which was geared towards extending the jurisdiction of socialism to the wider world, not surrendering territory unconditionally to the rival force of nationalism'.\textsuperscript{26} This incongruity made the harmonious coexistence of the countries impossible from the beginning, since the association under the same goal demanded forceful integration of the states that preferred to stay independent.

The initial nationalization and the rough Russification of Stalin resulted in resentment. The Soviet population started to realize that they were trapped in the imperially dominant realm of Russia and Russians. Russians constituted the majority of population and led economic and cultural development. Cultural propaganda promoted the image of Russia as the 'elder brother' who rightfully occupied a superior position. Russian language and culture represented the cornerstone of Soviet identity forged for decades, with other ethnicities playing a secondary role.\textsuperscript{27}

After Stalin’s death, national elites evolved into national 'mafias' that controlled the affairs of the republics with little regard for Moscow. In Robert Strayer’s words, this was made possible through 'pervasive links to the second economy and extensive networks of patronage and corruption'\textsuperscript{28} that emerged during the highly undisciplined Brezhnev era. At the same time, flourishing underground art also started spreading dissident ideas. Since Brezhnev’s and Khrushchev’s policies still considered Russification as an important step towards success, struggle against linguistic assimilation still persisted throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, keeping national consciousness alive. Due to the above mentioned reasons, by 1970’s national elites, as well as national feelings among the numerous nationalities had been developed enough to be able to resist Soviet domination. Gorbachev and his refusal to use force to settle conflicts offered an unprecedented opportunity to claim national rights.

Territorial administrative division of the empire also bore a national character: union republics were defined in either ethnic or national terms. This distinction was supposed to be temporary, until all nationalities dissolved into an all-Soviet identity. However, the presumption that socialism could become the foremost identification for millions of people was a crude underestimation of national identities. The leadership ‘unwittingly’ promoted
national consolidation, which in part assisted the creation of relevant national predecessors of civil society. Newly emerged elite was waiting for the advantageous moment to promote its anti-Communist tenets. When power grip loosened, ‘nationally defined’ countries had the necessary self-perception to fight for separate existence.

In spite the overwhelming power coagulated in Moscow, the Union was quasi-federalist in nature. Although this was simply a decorative structural distinction when strong authoritarian leaders were in power, it became an issue with weakened control since the republics had a legal right to self-determination and even sovereignty. Existence of the right of secession on paper allowed the possibility of independence on agenda. Mock federalism preserved the ambitions of non-Russian nationalities and protected them from unitary triumphalism.

Although multiculturalism does not automatically lead to failure, strong association with the government is crucial for its success. Furthermore, voluntary cultural assimilation, right to secede and peaceful redrawing of boundaries are the key to effective multicultural systems, which the Soviet Union did not allow. Considerable freedom of cultural expression combined with the dominance of ‘great Russia’ on institutional level made it impossible for non-Russian republics to associate with the state once the control from above was loosened. Since Gorbachev was unwilling to use force, the Union fell apart. Given the presence of awakened and militant nationalities in the Soviet Union, the dissolution was practically unavoidable.

Instead of trying to find new solution to the old predicament of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev decided to place the blame for strained relations between the centre and the republics on the shoulders of local leaders who according to him, practiced ‘ethnic isolationism [and] even national arrogance’. He failed to address the sensitive situation on the outskirts of the union precipitated by increased national consciousness. Representation of non-Russian nationalities had drastically fallen since 1956. By 1980’s only a few national representatives were left in Moscow, and in 1987 all Muslim republics and the Caucasus basically disappeared from the Politburo. Instead of curbing this tendency, Gorbachev replaced local authorities in the republics’ institutions of power. Helene Carrere d’Encausse believes that these changes led to the Russianization of the uppermost leadership cadres, and more importantly, contributed to their lack of awareness regarding the events occurring on the periphery. Coincidentally, the periphery was particularly restless during this period, and required special attention from the leadership, which Gorbachev overviewed or disregarded.
Vague nationalities policy and dissolution of existing power centers quickly transmuted local disfavor into full-blown independence movements. Local leaders contended that the centre was exercising unlimited power, preventing numerous ethnic groups to practice self-expression. Feeling scorned and ignored by Moscow, and left without a reliable intermediary with the centre, use of force against the center emerged as a viable alternative. Gorbachev might have been able to stop the protests by the use of terror, but his image as the champion of democracy prevented him from doing so. ‘Small-scale’ bloodsheds — killing civilians in Georgia in April, 1989, in Azerbaijan in January, 1990, and the ‘Bloody Sunday’ in Vilnius on January 13, 1991 — illustrate the leader’s temptation to adopt violence as the only realistic tool for ‘fixing’ the malfunctions of the empire.

The particular timing for the falling of the Soviet empire can be explained by the erosion of the very myths and illusions which sustained and legitimated the system for decades. At the same time, overwhelming development of the West generated a belief that the Soviet Union could not surpass the capitalist world. People realized that Soviet socialism was ‘built on violence and criminality of monstrous propositions’34. More specifically, Gorbachev’s failure was an outcome of two factors: the circumstances (the economic downfall, weakening of the socialist ideology, the Soviet nationalities policy and international attention to self-determination) and Gorbachev’s reckless policies in dismantling the power of the party. Superficial approach towards the problems at the periphery and disregard for the rising national discontent in the union republics resulted in nationalist movements that were impossible to handle without violence. Since Gorbachev had already deemed the use of force unacceptable, it was too late to give up the ‘liberal’ ideology of Perestroika. The Soviet empire disintegrated with a groundbreaking speed inasmuch as the values which it upheld were already perceived intolerable and outdated both on the international and domestic scene. Despite the failure of Perestroika, the remarkable transformations facilitated by Gorbachev cannot be disregarded. Confronted by transforming society and general mood ‘liberalism’, the leader managed to skillfully undermine the socialist party, corrode traditional culture without provoking a sharp conservative backlash, and most importantly, open up the rigid Soviet system to new political and economic forces35.
Notes:

4. Ibid., 25.
9. Ibid., 139-140.
12. Ibid., 68.
13. Ibid., 73.
17. Ibid.


25. Ibid., 72, 74.


28. Ibid., 75.


32. Ibid., 11.

33. Ibid., 10.

34. Ibid., 106.