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**Introduction**

This article examines the response of the Churches to the Anglo-Irish War.¹ The attitude of the Irish hierarchy to the First World War is contrasted with their view of the 1916 Rising to provide background and contrast to ecclesiastical reactions to the Anglo-Irish War, and to determine the extent to which just war criteria played a part in these judgements. Their response to the Anglo-Irish Treaty provides further material for contrast and comparison. It is apparent that the major point of contention was a key aspect of the *jus ad bellum*, the issue of right authority, and this was the point which was asserted by Britain in its claim to continue governing Ireland. It is argued that this was also the underlying assumption of the churches in Ireland.

**The First World War and the Easter Rising**

The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was established in 1913 with the aim of preventing the establishment of a Home Rule parliament under the Third Home Rule Act.² The Irish Volunteers, formed in response to the creation of the UVF, were split over the issue of recruitment into the British Army to fight in the First World War. Irish recruitment was actively supported by John Redmond, MP for Waterford City at Westminster, with the larger group, now called the National Volunteers, backing Redmond.³ The abstentionist group, now called the Irish Volunteers, mounted in an armed rebellion in Dublin in 1916, now called the 1916 Rising, declaring Ireland to be a Republic; however, the rising failed and the leaders were executed.⁴ However, the Sinn Féin party, created by the surviving leaders of the Rising, campaigned on the platform of independence from Britain. The General Election of 1918 saw Sinn Féin win the majority of nationalist seats.⁵ instead of taking their seats at Westminster, they set up an independent parliament in Dublin, in keeping with their election manifesto.⁶ The refusal of the British Government to recognise this newly declared Republic, and the refusal of the Sinn Féin Government to abandon their mandate, led to the Anglo-
Irish War of 1919-1921, which ultimately finished with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922.7

The response of the Protestant representatives of Ulster to the passing of the Home Rule Act was to provide moral support for the UVF and their threat to rebel if Home Rule were implemented. John Crozier, Archbishop of Armagh, devoted himself unreservedly to the preservation of the “Protestant province” and the arming of the Unionists, and along with the Presbyterian Moderator, Henry Montgomery, presided at a rally of 100,000 members of the newly-formed UVF on 13th April 1912. Charles D’Arcy, Bishop of Down and Connor, the Bishop of Derry, the Bishop of Clogher, among others, responded in similar terms.8 This forms a marked contrast to the attitude of the Irish Catholic clergy to the rise of the Irish Volunteers, the armed Nationalist group formed in 1914 in response to the creation and arming of the Ulster Volunteer Force. Many individual churchmen, if not the Church as a whole, regarded it as a threat of physical force against duly constituted authority.9

With the outbreak of war and the declaration of support by John Redmond, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, this stance by the Catholic bishops moderated to a degree, but only to the extent that the purpose of the Irish Volunteers coincided with that of Redmond’s Party. One bishop who was particularly fulsome in his commitment to recruitment and war was Patrick Foley, Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, who represented the War in terms of a holy crusade on the part of the armies of “justice and right”.10 The Irish Catholic was likewise unquestioning in its support. Six bishops sent congratulations to Redmond regarding the promise of home rule contained in the Government of Ireland Act.11 Taking into account expressions of opinion in speeches, letters to the press and so forth, an estimated twenty-one out of the twenty-seven bishops favoured the War, with three neutral, one (Cardinal Logue) undecided and two (Archbishop Walsh and Bishop O’Dwyer) opposed.12 In contrast to their expressions of spiritual support for armed rebellion in the face of an ordinance of the British Parliament, the Protestant prelates were also in favour of a war against Germany. The Church of Ireland Gazette enthusiastically hailed the War as an opportunity to unite North and South through “crushing the common enemy... of all civilisation,”13 and the Protestant Primate went even further, hailing it as the most righteous war in history.14 Redmond was praised by John Bernard, Protestant Bishop of Ossory, for his support for the War.15

The escalation of what was initially presented as a defence of Belgian neutrality into a global war brought with it destruction on a proportional scale, and this was one factor leading to loss of support for the War among many Irish Catholic bishops, so that by April 1916 only nine still supported
the War. Bishop Browne of Cloyne, for example, upheld the comparison between Ireland and Belgium. Benedict XV’s appeal on 28 July 1915 to “put an end... to this horrible slaughter” undoubtedly had a strong influence on this change. Other developments, such as the participation of Edward Carson in the new British cabinet, may also have had some bearing. The view among Protestant clergymen of the War itself as a kind of divine intervention against Home Rule was not uncommon, and Protestant commitment to the War came to be represented as a blood sacrifice for the sake of maintaining the Union.

This hardening of attitude among the Irish Catholic bishops led to accusations that they were pro-German, though Archbishop Bernard dismissed this in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, referring instead to their “disloyalty to the King, to Great Britain and to the Empire”. Some bishops, while still supporting Redmond, had reversed their views on the War since the previous year, one such being Abraham Brownrigg, who referred to it as “a shocking war for Christians”. The view which seemed to predominate, particularly after the Pope’s intervention, was that the conduct of the War made it unjustifiable in the eyes of the Church. However, it is noteworthy that such publications as The Tablet, which represented the voice of the English Catholic Church, had no qualms about the bloodshed of the War or its justification, and simply omitted any mention of the opposition to the War in Ireland, publishing only the Lenten pastorals of Bishops O’Donnell, Browne and McHugh, which were favourable to the War.

The 1916 Rising forced Irish prelates to confront the issue of the justifiability of armed rebellion. Their assumption at the outset of the First World War was, firstly, that Britain had the moral right to declare war, and, secondly, that just cause for war had been presented. However, the morality of Irish participation had been glossed over, and tended rather to be presented as more of a matter of quid pro quo than of duty to a lawful authority. Indeed, the issue of lawful authority proved to be the principal obstacle for the Catholic bishops in issuing an outright condemnation of the Rising. Patrick Murray’s assertion that the Rising did not meet any of the theological requirements for a just rebellion in fact sidesteps the issue: aside from the difficulty involved in securing popular consent to a rebellion, had the original orders for the Rising not been countermanded, an argument could be made that there was in fact a reasonable chance of success. The case could also be made that “intolerable and manifest tyranny” was actually manifested in the betrayal of
the Irish who had volunteered to fight for Britain on the promise of Home Rule. In any case, the fact that the issue was less than clear-cut is discernible in the variety of responses on the part of the Irish bishops.

The Protestant clergy’s response to the Rising was as ferocious and unequivocal in its condemnation as its support for the escalating mass carnage in Europe was passionate and unwavering. Archbishop Bernard of Dublin argued against the general pardon issued by Asquith (in an attempt to calm public opinion inflamed by the executions of the Rising’s leaders) calling instead for still more severe punishment. The Presbyterian journal Witness issued dire warnings of the horror and slaughter that would ensue if the Protestants were left to the mercy of the likes of Sinn Féin, and even, in an attempt to undermine the argument for self-government, denied that Ireland was a nation. The Church of Ireland Gazette praised the British soldiers who put down the rebellion as saviours from the horrors of revolution, this despite the Gazette’s own enthusiasm for a war which was in truth a revolution many orders of magnitude greater than the current object of its outrage. The general sense of indignation at the Rising also formed a marked contrast to the enthusiasm with which Northern Protestant prelates had themselves, just a short time previously, participated in UVF rallies and supported the UVF’s opposition to the government to which they implied Irish Catholics should adhere with unwavering enthusiasm.

The reaction of the Catholic prelates appeared to be comparable in its vehemence, with seven unreservedly condemning the Rising on the Sunday following its suppression. Bishop Hoare of Ardagh employed two jus ad bellum principles, that there must be a just cause, which he identified with there being “a real grievance and clear oppression,” and that there must be a strong probability of success, arguing that neither was present in this case. However, he did express a hope that the British Government would follow a policy of clemency, as he recognised that the executions had galvanised public opinion. Bishop Kelly of Ross refused to moderate his condemnation on this score, stating, despite the obvious involvement of British forces in crushing the Rising, that it was an Irish war for which the Irish were entirely to blame. Bishop Gilmartin of Clonfert likewise summarised his view of the conditions for justifiable revolt with some differences, namely that the government be judged by the majority of people to be tyrannical, that there be no legal means of redress available, and that armed resistance would avoid greater evils than it sought to remedy. However, he stated that he did not intend to “cast any aspersion on those who may have seemed to take a different view”. The silence of the other twenty four prelates may have been indicative of an actual unwillingness to condemn the Rising or merely a matter of
prudence pending consultation at the June meeting of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, their silence gave the impression, perhaps unintended, of approval, and specifically approval of Bishop O’Dwyer’s uncompromising defence of the Rising in just war terms.

O’Dwyer’s address to Limerick Corporation on 14 September 1916 stated that the Rising was an assertion of the right to self-rule, and that the same standards used in the case of Belgian resistance to the German incursion, the Serbian revolt against Austria, et al., should also be applied to the Rising. Bishop Patrick Foley, in correspondence with O’Dwyer, took issue with these statements, claiming that in his interpretation of Leo XIII’s pronouncements on the issue, and in the view of subsequent writers, rebellion is never lawful in a case where there is no violation of the agreement between people and sovereign on the latter’s part, and that, moreover, civil power derives immediately from God, not the people. O’Dwyer responded by questioning whether the same accusation of unlawfulness might be applied to the American revolt against England, for instance, and stating that, since English government of Ireland was de facto alone and had no moral sanction, rebellion was by implication lawful. He further countered Foley’s assertion of the divine bequest of power to the sovereign, stating that, in essence, Leo’s teaching was that the bond between people and sovereign is sacred, in whatever form it might take, but that he did not thereby intend to delimit the jurisdiction of sovereigns or the rights of subjects so far as to claim, for instance, that resistance was forbidden under any circumstance. O’Dwyer instead interpreted the doctrine to mean that only self-preservation, not bad government, forms an acceptable pretext for rebellion, such as in a case where the sovereign power acts against the nation itself; in that instance the act of rebellion must be undertaken by common consent. Foley countered that the denial of Home Rule could not be considered a grievance sufficient to justify rebellion. While nearly all the scholastics believed that the community as a whole had the right to rebel, this only applied to cases where the rulers were elected. The implication was that, in the case of rule by inheritance, such as monarchy, the only right to rebellion is that of self-defence, and that otherwise it would be an act of aggression. He concluded that an outside authority is desirable in order to decide whether a government can be described as a tyranny and whether there is a prospect of success, and that the only question would be in which body that authority would be vested. O’Dwyer responded that restricting the power to make such determinations to the Holy See would imply that the question was one only for Catholics rather than an issue relating to Christian ethics in the broad sense.
Andrew McGrath

O'Dwyer and Foley were in agreement that there are certain conditions in which people are entitled to rebel against duly constituted authority. While O'Dwyer held that the conduct of the Imperial Government towards Ireland rendered its authority to govern that country morally unsustainable, and hence by extension justified rebellion and a claim to self-government, Foley denied both premise and conclusion, though he was less certain concerning the ultimate conditions under which a ruler’s behaviour could be described as tyrannical and under which rebellion is licit. Second, and more importantly, both were in agreement that, discounting the question of misgovernment, the Imperial Parliament’s authority to govern Ireland was a given. This was in spite of the fact that the Parliament’s mandate had run out in 1915, and that Asquith’s 1915 coalition government, formed during wartime, had not been elected. The conclusion that might be drawn from this correspondence is that the Irish Catholic Church did not hold popular approval to be a necessary condition for a government to claim authority over a people, and thus to wage war, yet it cited the same condition as being absolutely necessary to justify armed rebellion.

Cardinal Logue’s pastoral of 25 November 1917 went some way toward impeding Catholic Church support for Sinn Féin, or at least support of what it interpreted as Sinn Féin’s “constitutional” aspirations. Logue was emphatic in his condemnation of the establishment of an Irish Republic, whether by seeking its recognition at the Peace Conference or through armed rebellion, both of which he seemed to consider as being morally on a par. Logue relied primarily on the principle of reasonable prospect of success, arguing that, given the means of destruction available to the British Empire, it would be folly to think of facing it in rebellion. However, perhaps the most significant aspect of Logue’s condemnation is the absence of the assumption that it is morally wrong per se to engage in armed rebellion. Perhaps Logue considered the aspect of reasonable prospect of success to be sufficiently compelling in its own right, but, particularly given the strength of his rhetoric on this single point, it is noteworthy that he omitted any other considerations against justified rebellion.

The passing of the Military Service Act in April 1918, which introduced conscription in Ireland, precipitated a unification of nationalist opinion in opposition to the measure, including the Catholic hierarchy and clergy, though this did not survive beyond the East Cavan by-election in June. The Episcopal Standing Committee met on the day the Conscription Bill was introduced, stating that there would be no need for the measure if Britain were to extend to Ireland the principles in defence of which it had gone to war, but clearly Britain thought otherwise. Rev. P. Coffey, Professor of Logic and
Metaphysics at St. Patrick’s College Maynooth, declared that, some dissenters aside, non-Catholics were at one with their Catholic countrymen in rejecting England’s authority in this matter.  

The basis on which Coffey defended armed resistance is noteworthy. He acknowledged that Ireland was subject to the Imperial Parliament, but as a distinct nation rather than after the manner of England, and when forced to merge its parliament with that of England did not surrender its right of consent to such measures. Considering the objection that acquiescence in the authority of the Parliament and collaboration with its administration led to it becoming the *de jure* authority over time, he suggested that this authority rested entirely on superior physical force. Furthermore, he states that, given the consistent subjection in which the Irish were held by the English and the fact that they were effectively treated as outlaws in their own land, if English rule at the time of the conquest had no moral authority, “nothing that happened subsequently up to the time of the Union could possibly have secured such authority for it”. He concluded that the mere lapse of time cannot give a conquering nation *de jure* authority over the conquered, but that it must govern in such a way that it secures their consent. The condition for the legitimacy of a conquering power is therefore just government, consent to which obliges the subject nation to obedience. However, a small nation’s proper end, its common good, “might not be attained by aiming at full self-government”, whereas it may be attained by aiming at the status of a dependent but mainly self-governing entity within a larger federation or empire. Coffey, therefore, went further than O’Dwyer, in that he argued, not that armed rebellion was justified by the Imperial Parliament’s conduct on the issue of Home Rule, but rather that the Parliament’s authority to legislate for Ireland was never legitimate in the first place. Rebellion against a specific measure passed by the Imperial Parliament in respect of the people of Ireland would therefore be legitimate by virtue of the lack of consent, not to this specific measure, but to the authority of that Parliament. This Parliament in turn had failed to secure the moral authority to impose such measures, as it had governed Ireland as hostile territory rather than as a country entitled to the same rights and subject to the same obligations as the inhabitants of Great Britain.

The hierarchy’s defiance on the issue of conscription was given its definitive statement at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Irish Catholic bishops on 9 April 1918. The statement, written by eight bishops, including Logue, all of whom were known for their conservative opinions on political matters, emphasised the lack of consent to the measure on the part of the Irish people: “To enforce conscription here without the consent of the
people would be perfectly unwarrantable... Had the Government in any reason-
able time given Ireland the benefit of the principles which are declared to be at stake in the War, by the concession of a full measure of self-government, there would have been no occasion for contemplating forced levies from her now”.52 This was effectively a denial on the part of the hierarchy that the Imperial Parliament had the authority to enforce the measure in Ireland.

One response to the crisis on the Northern Protestant side was particularly remarkable given the furore over the Rising. The Very Rev. Joseph Brady of Armagh, claiming to be following the example of Edward Carson, organised a series of meetings of priests and people of the parish with the objective of founding a “Solemn League and Covenant” against conscription. In the case of this league, however, the procurement of weapons and drilling would be eschewed in favour of the “constitutional” resort of passive resistance, which was not theologicaIly problematic.53 The support offered to Carson’s insurrectionist UVF by the British Conservative Party suggested that armed force against the Government would meet with approval in the former case even if it did not in the case of the latter.54 This apparent demonstration of solidarity with the Southern Catholic position did not have any positive impact on British Catholic opinion, as indicated by The Tablet’s defence of conscription.55 This was hardly surprising. Whereas Irish Catholic prelates had condemned the Rising in terms of the illegality of rebellion against lawful authority, the Church had now officially committed itself to an act of rebellion against that same authority on the issue of conscription.

The Anglo-Irish War

The general consensus among Irish prelates regarding the armed campaign following the election of Sinn Féin in 1918 was to asset a moral presumption against the use of force. While this stance may seem inconsistent given the initial enthusiasm with which the same prelates had embraced Britain’s war effort in 1914, the underlying assumption was in fact unchanged. While their support for this war faded due to the escalating carnage in Europe, though this was not the only consideration, the IRA’s armed campaign against the British forces was placed on the same moral footing with the actions of the latter. The position, in other words, was that the IRA had no right to resort to war in the first place, and this judgement permitted their campaign to be addressed in the same terms as the British attack on the Dáil. Despite the political changes that occurred with the 1918 General Election, the position of the Churches was that the context for their pronouncements
was the same as it had been in 1916. Abuses of power aside, elected or not, the Imperial Parliament was held to be the only government of Ireland, and therefore it alone had the authority to wage war.

Fr. William Delany J, President of University College Dublin, in a letter to Archbishop Walsh in November 1920, condemned IRA actions as “abominable assassinations” the doing of which incurred the penalty of excommunication. Likewise Logue, while denouncing British actions, likewise associated the IRA campaign with Bolshevism, while his pastoral letter of 21 December equated the two sides in moral terms, stating that armed force was not the proper Christian response to British repression. The bishops’ statement from Maynooth on 24 June blamed Britain for provoking the situation, rejecting British claims that reprisals were not official policy, but nevertheless condemned IRA actions, suggesting that the acts of both sides were morally indistinguishable. While it would be easy to read the bishops’ condemnation of British actions as being the more significant factor, thus overshadowing their condemnation of the IRA campaign as “crimes,” the latter characterisation is in fact the more relevant, given that it serves to remove any substantial ground for criticising the British campaign. Although Bishops O’Doherty of Clonfert and O’Dea of Galway and Archbishop Gilmartin of Tuam castigated Hamar Greenwood and Nevil Macready for imposing a policy of reprisals, they did not question the right of the British authorities to engage in warfare in Ireland in the first place. This right was explicitly denied to the IRA by O’Dea, for example, who stated that no legitimate authority had declared or authorised a war against “the police”, i.e. the RIC. This denial that the Irish Government was acting in self-defence during the Anglo-Irish War was typical of the bishops’ responses; however, it was not the reason the bishops held the IRA’s campaign to be unjust. They were making the wider claim that, whether or not there was a just cause, the Irish Government had no moral right to fight at all. Given that the denial of the right to go to war is, in effect, the denial of legitimate authority, in uttering this denial the hierarchy were defending the British claim to be the legitimate government in Ireland.

Walter McDonald’s *Some Ethical Questions of Peace and War* was intended as a reply to the article by Rev. Coffey, though, as the book was published in 1919, its line of argument has a wider significance. Though the argument purports to oppose itself to the general trend of ecclesiastical opinion, it in fact provides at greater length a defence of the very same position expressed by most of the bishops, that, election or no election, the Imperial Parliament was the only legitimate government of Ireland through right of conquest, and that, election or no election, warfare against that government could have
Andrew McGrath

no justification. McDonald represented Coffey’s argument, “which seems to represent the mind of Sinn Féin”, as claiming that no independent nation ceases to be independent *de jure* except by popular consent, and as Ireland was at one time an independent nation, and never consented to resign that status, Ireland was therefore independent *de jure*. The main point in this refutation was the assumption that unity of rule and independence are requisites of nationhood, and this allowed McDonald to arrive rapidly at the conclusion that Ireland was not a nation. The conflation of nationhood with statehood led naturally to the conclusion that Ireland had no separate identity from England as a nation.

However, McDonald was quite clearly contending that the basis of authority is conquest, and that self-determination is not a fundamental right of any nation but something that is earned after tutelage by the conquering power. It is not necessary to exaggerate the significance of McDonald’s views on the inferiority of native peoples and the need to provide them with enlightened tutelage in the ways of civilization, except that they formed the basis for the doctrine of development, whereby a people was held only to become worthy of self-rule, presumably in the eyes of an imperial power, if they were deemed to be sufficiently advanced. McDonald’s argument is that the people of Ireland would only be entitled to self-rule, firstly, if they were far enough “advanced in culture” to be capable of government, and secondly, provided that they may be trusted to make legitimate use of it, not to “secure a larger measure of independence than is their due”.

McDonald demonstrates the utility of the doctrine in his reference to the Irish Republic, where he claims that only a third of the electorate voted for it, while a “considerable number” did so just to oust the Parliamentary Party or to secure a fuller measure of Home Rule. Thus, a general election, the sole aim of which is to determine who governs according to which policy, was transformed by McDonald into a referendum on Home Rule, the attainment of which even the Home Rule party knew was a dead letter, and well before that time. However, he is prepared to justify the resort to arms to secure independence if, in the hypothetical case, Ireland were “entitled” to such, and if there were reasonable prospect of success, or even if Ireland were to be denied Home Rule. McDonald never addresses the question of why Ireland should have been entitled to self-determination in the form of Home Rule under the auspices of the Imperial Parliament, yet not entitled to self-determination in the form of independence, as surely, if Ireland were developed enough to demand, and be entitled to, the one, it would be sufficiently developed for independence as well.
McDonald conceded that the demand for revolution is effectively the right to undertake it, given certain limitations. However, the result is that he granted to force of arms what he was unwilling to grant to the ballot box, arguing that revolutionaries are not in opposition to legitimate authority when independence becomes due, as they are the legitimate authority. In other words, the imperial power decides whether a country is deserving of independence, and may either concede independence by its own act and in its own interests (in which case it is not independence) or may be fought legitimately for independence.

The most thorough and substantive application of just war criteria with respect to the Anglo-Irish War appears in the pastoral letters of Daniel Cohalan, Bishop of Cork. While Cohalan held that the British government’s authority over Ireland had no moral sanction, being based simply on force, it did not follow that there was a moral right to engage in armed resistance. He counselled submission to state oppression, given that active resistance would lead to further unlawful oppression from the British side. As Pádraig Corkery indicates, this line was consistent with that given in the October 1920 statement by the Irish Bishops. However, Cohalan’s concern that civil order might be disrupted by active resistance to oppression is a little odd in context, given that such oppression was, in 1920, the source of a great deal of civil disorder. Furthermore, in his application of just war principles Cohalan did not see justice as lying on either side, choosing instead to regard all killings, whether of civilians, British Army, RIC or IRA as murder.

Cohalan’s use of the *jus in bello* principle of proportionality can be identified in his treatment of the British policy of reprisals. IRA attacks on members of the RIC or the British Army would invariably lead to civilian deaths and the destruction of property, and therefore were in breach of the principle. However, the reasoning used by Cohalan is rather tortuous, in that it places the blame on the IRA for attacks against the Irish population by the British army and the RIC. While undoubtedly an unintentional consequence of his use of the principle of proportionality, within a just war framework this effectively absolves the British forces of any responsibility for their own actions, and attributes it entirely to the IRA. The argument is that, IRA actions inevitably being the cause of a disproportionate response, the IRA actions themselves were unjustified because they were to blame for this response. This argument does not stand up, because it assumes the British response was inevitable or unavoidable rather than a war policy which was consciously formulated and pursued by Westminster. Cohalan undoubtedly saw the British response as being excessive and unjustified, and described it in similar terms
Andrew McGrath

to the IRA campaign, but that does not necessarily mean that he actually viewed them as being equivalent in moral terms.

The major point of Cohalan's just war approach is the rejection of the Republic as a sovereign independent state, and hence of its authority to wage war. The British state, though its methods were unjustifiable, was still the sovereign state of Great Britain and Ireland, and as such it still had a moral right to declare war. Cohalan's disapproval of the shooting of "police-men" echoes that of Benedict XV, and similarly represents the situation as not being a state of war but of rebellion, a state of unrest internal to the United Kingdom, even though he must have been aware that the RIC at that time were not police but a paramilitary force. His response to Cardinal Bourne's statement that an oath-bound society was responsible for the killing of British agents on Bloody Sunday was to explain that the situation was a response to the erroneous belief that, because the elected representatives of the Irish people had declared a Republic, it was in fact a Republic, and that the RIC were simply overstepping the mark in doing their duty. However, as Corkery points out, the interpretation of the just war principle of competent authority Cohalan gave in his 1921 Lenten Pastoral was rather strained. While acknowledging that the Irish people had chosen their elected representatives, he viewed these members of the Dáil as being "advocates of the policy... of Ireland to choose her form of government" rather than as simply constituting the form of government that had resulted from Ireland's exercise of that right. Likewise, he denied that the elected members of the Dáil could unilaterally declare a Republic, despite having been elected on the promise that they would do so, and also denied that they had the right to defend the Republic in arms. Therefore, Cohalan seems to have interpreted the results of the 1918 General Election as being a moral assertion of the right to elect representatives rather than an act of self-determination in itself. By denying that the Dáil had the right to fulfil its own raison d'être he was denying that the Dáil had any authority to pass laws and implement policies; in other words, he was denying the very right he appeared to be defending.

This view is expressed even more clearly in Cohalan's 1922 Pastoral Letter, where he claimed that the oath taken by the Dáil in 1919 was not an oath "for the establishment of an Irish Republic" but one of fidelity to the Republic as already existing, and therefore, because neither Republic nor government actually existed, the oath was invalid. The distinction Cohalan makes here is obscure, as it is hard to imagine how the Dáil could fulfil an oath to establish a Republic if it had no authority to do so, yet he appeared to envisage a situation in which it could — just not the current one. He seems to have been arguing that no government elected by the Irish people could
have self-declared political authority over the island. This view of legitimacy coincides with that of Walter McDonald; both agreed that the Imperial Parliament was the sole authority in Ireland, regardless of what its people might think, and that if a Republic were to be declared, that declaration could only come from the Imperial Parliament. Lest this interpretation seem an exaggeration of Cohalan’s position, one need only refer to the position of the bishops following the Treaty settlement, to be discussed below, that not only was the Provisional government, set up after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922, the legitimate government of Ireland, but that it succeeded the Imperial Government in this regard, which was, therefore, likewise considered to have been the legitimate government of Ireland. The government set up on the basis of the 1918 elections was, consequently, illegitimate. The legitimate succession endorsed by Cohalan and the other bishops was the Free State Government, set up on the basis of the Better Government of Ireland Act 1920, an act passed by a Parliament which the Irish people had no part in electing, succeeding the Imperial Government, which likewise had not been elected by the people of Ireland but nevertheless claimed to have the right to govern Ireland. It should be noted that this position is essentially indistinguishable from that of the bishops’ Protestant counterparts.

Cohalan’s denunciation of violence during the Anglo-Irish War, while it appeared to be even-handed, relied on the view that the Sinn Féin Government was simply a party which had temporarily refused to take its place in Westminster, its proper and only place. Hence one finds Cohalan engaging in apologetics for RIC (Black and Tan and Auxiliary) atrocities in his 1920 Christmas Pastoral Letter, where he refers to them as “police,” implying that they were simply engaged in their normal functions and that their excesses were simply a response to pressure from the IRA. Far from considering the methods of either side, Cohalan simply placed the blame on the IRA for initiating the conflict in the first place, thus causing a “spiral” in which the British Government and its agents played no conscious part. Secondly, in his failure to properly explicate his reasoning on the grounds of lawful authority, Cohalan refused to commit explicitly to a position that would either give legitimacy to the Sinn Féin Government or withhold it. He affirmed the principle of democratic self-determination for Ireland while at the same time condemning those efforts to secure it which involved military means. While Cohalan’s concern at the destruction of life and property that ensued during the War was undoubtedly sincere, he never questioned the right of the British Government to wage war in Ireland. Neither, for that matter, did he question the right of the British Government to continue governing in Ireland, despite his professed belief in the right to self-determination.
The most substantial response from the Protestant side to the Anglo-Irish War came from Dr Charles D’Arcy, Church of Ireland Bishop of Dublin (later Bishop of Armagh), who, in his address to the Church Synod, took the opportunity to advise the British Government as to its approach. He stated that the course should be considered carefully, and, once decided on, should be prosecuted “with the ruthlessness of fate”. The policy he advocated was the commitment by Britain of all the resources at its disposal to Ireland, as the wiser course would be too many soldiers rather than too few, and excessive force rather than yielding to the forces of disorder. Comparing D’Arcy’s pronouncement with those of the Catholic bishops, one is struck by the openness with which he was prepared to advocate the infliction of any degree of force sooner than accept the alternative, which was to admit that the de jure government of Ireland was also the de facto one. He also made the frank admission that the issue at stake was nothing less than British rule in Ireland.

Rev. Patrick Gannon recognised the significance of D’Arcy’s utterance, and went so far as to connect it directly with the commencement of the Black and Tan campaign. Whether or not it had any actual influence on policy, it forms an interesting analogue to Cohalan’s condemnation of the IRA’s military operations, in that it provided an ecclesiastical seal of approval for RIC actions that Cohalan, given his audience, chose not to give. However, Gannon argued that D’Arcy’s sentiments were entirely inappropriate; D’Arcy was a primate of a national Church, yet according to Gannon, he was calling for the invasion of his own country by another, as the rule of that other country over his own was at stake, and that nothing must be left to chance in securing that end. Furthermore, in response to a statement by the Catholic bishops of 26 April 1922, D’Arcy, in a letter co-authored with the Protestant Bishop of Down and Connor, the Moderator of the Presbyterian General Assembly and the President of the Methodist Conference, engaged in an attempt to justify anti-Catholic pogroms in the North. This letter advised the Catholic bishops to preach “submission to the authority of the community to which [they belonged],” yet, as Gannon stated in response, D’Arcy failed to answer the question of what he meant by his use of the term “community,” or from where legitimate political authority derives within such a community. Gannon further traces the origin of the current strife to the failure to satisfactorily address that question. The irony is that such criticisms apply just as well to the stance of the Irish bishops. That is not to say that they, like D’Arcy, were willing to call openly for the application of whatever military force was required to reassert British rule in Ireland. However, they answered Gannon’s question regarding the origin of political authority in Ireland by asserting
that it lay in Westminster, in the sense that they denied Ireland the right to declare independence or convene its own assembly without permission from the Imperial Parliament; if it did so without such permission, that assembly therefore had no legitimacy. Even when the consequences of Britain’s war policy in Ireland were plain to see, the objections the Catholic bishops raised addressed only the means employed, not the end that they served. The fundamental agreement therefore remained, that Ireland was not entitled to secede from Britain unless Britain so decided.

The Church of Ireland Gazette provided support for D’Arcy’s call for ruthless military repression by making claims that were similar in many ways to those used to justify Britain’s involvement in the First World War.90 Witness, as if in answer to the rhetoric it had employed in 1916, portrayed many military actions against Protestant targets as sectarian attacks,91 and in any case as simple murders with no possible justification. Its editorial of 17 June 1921 referred to “local bands of lawless men” who attacked Protestants out of animosity or because they coveted their property. However, it also stated that the Roman Catholic population had provided Sinn Féin “with a sphere of influence and moral, or rather should we say, immoral support” which made the latter's work possible.92 It also made an interesting distinction in this regard which is worth noting. Referring to Sinn Féin's claim that attacks on Protestants were not made by virtue of their religion but because they acted against Sinn Féin, it stated that since Protestants “cannot do otherwise by virtue of their religion,” it is a distinction without a difference. Therefore, it conceded that attacks against Protestants were not motivated by their religion, but rather by their political allegiances. The attempt to conflate politics and religion, by arguing that these Protestants were bound by virtue of their faith to be loyal to the Empire, reflects Imperial assumptions concerning the inextricability of Protestantism and Britishness, rather than a serious analysis of the political situation. The argument that Protestants were targeted, not because they acted against legally constituted authority in Ireland, but because of their own identification of Protestantism with loyalty to the Imperial Parliament is essentially a claim that they were targeted because of their own self-identification. Witness clearly did see a difference between the political and religious issues, but tried to reconcile, or obscure, that difference in its analysis.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty

The Irish Catholic bishops, in contrast to their refusal to give moral backing to the Irish Government and their condemnation of the IRA, gave
their unreserved support to the Treaty and the Free State Government. Archbishops Gilmartin and Harty, along with Bishops Cohalan, Hallinan of Limerick, and O’Doherty of Galway, embraced the Free State Government as the true government of Ireland, emphasising the consent of the people as the sole criterion for the legitimacy of government.93 This opinion was reinforced and consolidated in the joint pastoral of 10 October 1922, in which the bishops spelled out their teaching on obedience to lawful authority. According to this letter, the government “set up by the nation” commanded the respect and obedience of all citizens, regardless of what particular form that government might take. Correlatively, revolt against a government thus legitimately established was unjustifiable. Hence, the rebellion against the Free State Government by the anti-Treaty faction of the IRA was condemned in terms which recall Cohalan’s condemnation of the IRA, in that all the destruction caused in the Civil War, much of it actually perpetrated by Free State forces using weaponry supplied by the British, was attributed entirely to the anti-Treaty forces.94 Indeed, the bishops claimed that the IRA was responsible for more destruction during the Civil War than was caused by British forces in 30 years. However, such claims indicated that bishops were willing to extend their full support to the Free State Government as the legitimate government of Ireland, a claim they never supported in the case of the elected government of Ireland during the Anglo-Irish War.

The principal basis for the bishops’ approval of the Free State Government was its election by popular mandate. The bishops did not refer to other circumstances that might have differentiated that particular election from previous ones as far as legitimacy was concerned, nor did they address any potential mitigating circumstances that could have accounted for a rebellion against the imposition of the Treaty. However, they were by no means so committed to the principle of self-determination by popular mandate in the case of the 1918 Election, or, for that matter, the 1921 Election, in both of which a separatist government was indisputably chosen by the people. On the contrary, they refused to admit that that government was legitimate, regardless of the strength of the mandate. It might be asked what caused such a change in perspective on the part of the bishops, given that the evaluation they employed did not appeal to non-moral considerations.

The elections both during and after the Anglo-Irish War were conducted under the auspices of the Imperial Parliament under conditions of more or less universal suffrage, and the popular vote resulted in governments being set up in Dublin according to the majority preference that was expressed, and the governments expressed their intention of fulfilling the mandate they had been given. However, the 1918 Election was called by a British govern-
ment which had, strictly speaking, not been elected, as the electoral franchise was not renewed in 1915, when it had fallen due, because of the First World War. The 1923 Election took place under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which mandated that Ireland was to be governed by two separate parliaments, Northern and Southern. This Act was passed by the British parliament in the name of Ireland, even though there was already a parliament in Ireland which had been elected by the people and as such had sole authority to legislate for Ireland. The Free State Government proceeded to implement the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, acting under the terms of the Free State Constitution which had essentially been drafted by the British. Neither of these documents was submitted for ratification by the electorate, and the terms of the Treaty were not even published until the day of the election. Therefore, unlike the 1918 and 1921 Elections, the 1923 Election saw the electorate being led by a government which they had elected into accepting the voluntary self-limitation of that government’s authority according to the terms of an agreement on which they were never consulted.

Therefore, the bishops embraced the Free State Government as the choice of the electorate, and likewise embraced its commitment to enforce the Treaty. They had rejected the Sinn Féin Government’s authority under the very same criteria they now applied to the Free State Government, even though both governments were elected by the people. Further, the bishops accepted without question the Free State’s right to wage war against the anti-Treaty forces, where they had previously rejected as immoral the IRA’s campaign and denied that the Sinn Féin Government had the moral authority to sanction or direct military action. It is difficult to conclude that the bishops were correct in these varying understandings of legitimacy. Cohalan had asserted the right of the Irish people to self-determination while rejecting the actual manifestation because, to put it bluntly, the Imperial Parliament had played no role in underwriting that manifestation. The bishops recognised the Free State Government as the sovereign authority in Ireland simply because of the part played by the Imperial Parliament in arranging that state of affairs. The Free State Government was obliged under the terms of the Treaty to refrain from matters pertaining to foreign and military affairs; hence, in fostering the notion that the Free State Government constituted some kind of achievement of sovereign authority, the bishops were in fact fostering an illusion.95 The Free State Government had no freedom of choice in the areas that mattered; it was not a sovereign government, and a vote for the pro-Treaty side was not self-determination, but simply a vote within a constitutional framework defined by Westminster.96 Yet for this very reason
the bishops were willing for the first time to acknowledge the authority of the popular vote.

The southern Protestant hierarchy likewise gave the Free State their full backing, just as it had the British forces whose continued government of Ireland they had supported in the Anglo-Irish War, referring to it as the only protection against the “forces of anarchy”. Witness reported the killing of “Protestants”, actually loyalist informers who also happened to be Protestants, in Dunmanway, Co. Cork. Perhaps in an attempt to distract from the fact of official encouragement and support for anti-Catholic pogroms in Ulster, the Church of Ireland Gazette painted a picture of an all-out purge of Protestants by hard-pressed anti-Treaty forces in Tipperary, Westmeath and Galway. However, regardless of the failure of the Free State Government to prevent such supposed anti-Protestant cleansing from taking place, so unreserved had Protestant support become for the Government that the Gazette contributed a fulsome tribute to Michael Collins on the occasion of his death.

Protestant support for the Free State shared common ground with that of the Catholic bishops, namely, a professed concern for order as against the disorder manifested in the Civil War. However, though the symptoms were invoked as evidence, the causes were not examined by either Catholic or Protestant churches, perhaps because both shared the common presupposition that Ireland could only be governed from Westminster, and that any attempt to assert otherwise was self-refuting. Consistent with the eagerness with which they had urged war on whomever Westminster decided was the enemy, whether German or Irish, the Protestant prelates shared the Catholic bishops’ view that opposition to the Free State must be dealt with militarily. The conclusion can be drawn that neither Protestant nor Catholic Churches in Ireland were prepared to evaluate the morality of armed force on its own terms, but were rather inclined to do so according to the political affiliation of those who essayed it.

Conclusion

While the Catholic bishops were less ready than their Protestant counterparts to approve of military action against officially declared enemies of the British Empire, their objections were based largely on the means employed rather than the morality of the resort to force itself. The presumption seems to have been that, irrespective of the means, whether in Europe or in Ireland, the British state was not at fault in waging war. The question of right authority was in fact never seriously applied to the British state by the Catholic
bishops. On the other hand, where Ireland was concerned, bishops such as Cohalan insisted on applying the full rigour of just war theory. What notable exceptions there were to this pattern tended to occur lower in the hierarchy, while on the Protestant side there were no exceptions to speak of. Protestant and Catholic churches alike adhered to the consensus that while the Imperial Government had no case to answer for declaring war, Ireland had no right to do so of its own initiative. They discerned that this issue, the right to declare war, was a defining characteristic of independent statehood, and were consistent in denying it to Ireland, regardless of Irish opinion on the matter.

Notes:


11. Ibid., 12.
12. Ibid., 12.
13. *Church of Ireland Gazette* 56 (2 October 1914), 804.
14. *Church of Ireland Gazette* 56 (4 September 1914), 737.
15. Tanner, 277.
22. Ibid.
23. *Church of Ireland Gazette* 58. 10 March 1916, 180.
25. The Catholic Church offered requiem Masses for the executed leaders, which were attended by huge numbers (Tomás Ó Fiaich, “The Catholic Clergy and the Independence Movement”, *The Capuchin Annual* 1970, 480-502.
29. Miller, ibid., 198.
30. Aan de Wiel, 96; *The Irish Catholic*, 13th May 1916.
31. Aan de Wiel, 97.
33. As per aan de Wiel, 96.
34. Miller, ibid.
35. *Collectanea Hibernica* No. 18/19 (1976-1977), 188.
36. Ibid., 190-191.
37. Ibid. 192.
38. Ibid., 195, 196-197.
39. Ibid., 207.
40. Ibid., 206, 209.
42. Ibid., 210.
43. Miller, *Church, State and Nation*, 399.
44. O‘Fiaich, 482.
45. Miller, op. cit., 402.
47. Ibid., 487.
48. Ibid., 489.
49. Ibid., 494.
50. Ibid., 496.
51. Ibid., 497.
53. Miller, *Church, State and Nation*, 403.
55. *The Tablet*, 13th April 1918.
58. Ibid., 270.
61. For example Miller, *Church, State and Nation in Ireland*, 456.
62. Ibid., 456-457.
65. Ibid., 10.
66. Another question to be addressed to McDonald’s argument is how states come to be in the first place, if nations are nothing more than states.
67. See for example 53, 103.
68. McDonald’s argument by analogy between organisms and social entities (54) seems to form his entire case for the doctrine, aside from his interpretations of historical examples.
69. McDonald, 61.
70. Ibid., 38.
71. The evidence for this is the Home Rule Party’s electoral pact with Sinn Féin, under which many constituencies were not contested.
72. Ibid., 95, 107.
73. Ibid., 107.
77. Corkery, 118.
78. Cohalan, “Pastoral Letter in the Aftermath of the Burning of Cork”.
80. Ibid., 61-62.
81. Corkery, 119.
82. “Lenten Pastoral for 1920.”
83. Corkery, 119.
85. Keogh, op. cit., 60-61; see also *The Times*, 15 November 1920. For further discussion of this issue, see William Sheehan, *A Hard Local War: The British


88. Ibid., 10–11.

89. Ibid., 12.

90. Church of Ireland Gazette, 17 June 1921. Borgonovo (ibid., 92–93). See however Lionel Curtis, “Ireland,” in The Round Table, Vol. xi, Issue 43 (June 1921), where he states that “to conceive the struggle as religious in character is... misleading.” At a Protestant Convention held in the Mansion House, Dublin, on 11 May 1922, Archdeacon Daly of Clonfert stated that, “hostility to Protestants by reason of their religion, has been almost, if not wholly unknown, in the 26 counties in which they are a minority,” a view which was reiterated at a meeting of the Protestant Orphan Society by a Mr. Sergeant Hanna in the presence of John Gregg, Church of Ireland Archbishop of Dublin (The Irish Independent, 12 May 1922; The Irish Independent, 29 April 1922).

91. Witness, 1 April 1921, 6 May 1921, 22 April 1922.

92. Witness, 17 June 1921.


94. Irish Ecclesiastical Record 20, 547.

95. This aspect was addressed by the Carmelite Bernard Ó Maoiléidigh’s attack on the Bishops’ October Pastoral, “Reply to the Pastoral Issued by the Irish Hierarchy, October 1922” (Terence MacSwiney Papers, UCD Archives P48a/223). Contrary to Murray’s dismissal of this argument (Murray, Oracles of God, 8) as simply an example of the partisanism that characterised “Republican discourse,” it is clear that O’Maoiléidigh, besides simply indicating a historical parallel between Church support for the British position in 1798 and 1867, and again in 1922, wished to indicate that there may have been a rationale for this which extended beyond, as Murray has it, “the long-standing commitment of the Church to social stability” (ibid.). It could hardly be contended, for instance, that, given its policies in Ireland, Europe and the Middle East during this period, Westminster’s main concern was the fostering of social stability.

96. For text of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, see Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, 6 December 1921, Articles 1, 4, 5. Available at http://www.nationalarchives.ie/topics/anglo_irish/dfaexhib2.html.

97. *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 22 January 1922.
99. *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 22 June 1922.
100. *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 23 August 1922.